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Abstract 
 
The popularity of hybrid instruments as a tax planning technique has grown over the years. 
There is an increasing global awareness on the use of these instruments and on addressing the 
tax gaps created by these instruments. South Africa introduced significant amendments to the 
legislation on hybrid debt instruments, ahead of many countries around the globe. This 
research report examines hybrid debt instruments and the tax concerns which have created 
the need for specific tax legislation addressing such instruments. It considers tax policies 
proposed by the international tax fraternity, global trends in changes to tax policies and South 
Africa‘s stance on such tax policies. The amended section 8F and new section 8FA of the 
Income Tax Act are included in this consideration.  
 
Key words: arrangement, debt, deductible, dividend, equity, host country, interest, hybrid 
debt instrument, hybrid interest, home country, tax 
  
4 
 
Table of contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
CHAPTER ONE – Background and relevance ......................................................................... 7 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 7 
Research problem ................................................................................................................. 10 
Statement of the problem .................................................................................................. 10 
The sub-problems ............................................................................................................. 11 
Scope and limitations ........................................................................................................... 13 
Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 13 
CHAPTER TWO – The legal nature and classification of hybrid debt ................................... 14 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 14 
Corporate funding – the debt/equity distinction ................................................................... 14 
Debt/Equity (legal) classification from a practical perspective ........................................... 17 
Debt/Equity (legal) classification practices in South Africa ................................................ 19 
Classification challenges – deviations from ‗pure‘ funding................................................. 21 
Hybrid finance definitions .................................................................................................... 23 
Features of hybrid debt instruments in practice ................................................................... 24 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 26 
CHAPTER THREE – The tax classification of debt and equity and its related concerns ....... 27 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 27 
Debt/Equity classification – relevance from a tax perspective ............................................ 27 
Debt versus Equity – South African income tax implications ............................................. 29 
Debt funding income tax implications .............................................................................. 29 
Equity funding income tax implications ........................................................................... 32 
Debt versus Equity – tax revenues earned by tax authorities ............................................... 34 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 36 
CHAPTER FOUR – Cross-border hybrid debt and its related concerns ................................. 37 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 37 
Cross-border tax planning opportunities .............................................................................. 37 
Leveraging ........................................................................................................................ 38 
Layered group structures .................................................................................................. 40 
Global impact of hybrid tax planning mechanisms .............................................................. 42 
Practical examples of cross-border hybrid debt instruments ............................................... 45 
5 
 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 47 
CHAPTER FIVE – Global policy recommendations on addressing the bias towards debt 
funding ..................................................................................................................................... 48 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 48 
The need for a debt/equity distinction .................................................................................. 48 
Proposed policy options and special tax rules ...................................................................... 50 
Thin capitalisation and other interest deductibility rules .................................................. 50 
Dividend relief techniques ................................................................................................ 51 
Withholding taxes ............................................................................................................. 52 
Anti-avoidance rules ......................................................................................................... 53 
Uniform tax treatment for debt and equity ....................................................................... 54 
Schanz-Haig-Simons tax system ...................................................................................... 56 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 57 
CHAPTER SIX – Global policy recommendations on the use of hybrid debt funding .......... 58 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 58 
The OECD‘s project on hybrid funding ............................................................................... 58 
Scope and purpose of the OECD recommendations ............................................................ 59 
OECD recommendations...................................................................................................... 61 
Hybrid financial instrument recommendation .................................................................. 61 
Financial instrument recommendation ............................................................................. 63 
OECD imported mismatch recommendation ................................................................... 64 
Implementation challenges relating to the OECD recommendations .................................. 65 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 67 
CHAPTER SEVEN – Tax policies currently applied by other jurisdictions ........................... 69 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 69 
Debt/Equity tax classification trends.................................................................................... 69 
Australia............................................................................................................................ 71 
The Netherlands ................................................................................................................ 72 
United Kingdom ............................................................................................................... 73 
United States ..................................................................................................................... 74 
Singapore .......................................................................................................................... 75 
Other European countries ................................................................................................. 76 
Hybrid debt tax treatment trends .......................................................................................... 78 
Denial of deductions ......................................................................................................... 78 
6 
 
Denial of exemptions ........................................................................................................ 79 
Common problems ........................................................................................................... 80 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 81 
CHAPTER EIGHT – Tax policies adopted by South Africa .................................................. 82 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 82 
Background to the introduction of hybrid debt legislation .................................................. 82 
Initial legislation on hybrid debt – section 8F ...................................................................... 87 
Ambit of initial legislation ................................................................................................ 87 
Other concerns of the initial legislation ............................................................................ 90 
Addressing the concerns of initial legislation ................................................................... 91 
Current legislation on hybrid debt – sections 8F and 8FA ................................................... 92 
Hybrid debt instrument – ambit of section 8F .................................................................. 93 
Hybrid interest – ambit of section 8FA ............................................................................ 95 
Summary of ambit of sections 8F and 8FA ...................................................................... 96 
Application by the courts – substance over form ............................................................. 97 
Tax implications of falling within sections 8F and 8FA .................................................. 98 
Policy approach in comparison with other countries and OECD recommendations ......... 104 
CHAPTER NINE – Report summary and conclusion ........................................................... 109 
Reference list ......................................................................................................................... 114 
APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................................ 122 
APPENDIX B ........................................................................................................................ 124 
 
  
7 
 
CHAPTER ONE – Background and relevance 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the years, there has been an increasing awareness of tax planning techniques undertaken 
by individual corporations and multinational groups (OECD, 2013a:13). There appears to be 
a growing trend towards the use of tax planning techniques by multinational groups and, 
consequently, the reduction of corporate taxes that are paid by these groups (OECD, 
2013a:15). Globalisation and economic developments have resulted in multinational groups 
structuring their operations across different countries (OECD, 2013a:25). This progression 
towards global business models which extend across different tax jurisdictions has 
contributed to the use of tax planning techniques and the ability of these multinational groups 
to reduce their overall taxes. In addition, domestic and international taxation rules may not 
have kept pace with these changes and advancements, creating further opportunities for tax 
planning (OECD, 2013a:27-28). One of the tax planning techniques identified is the use of 
hybrid instruments, which is considered a key area that needs to be addressed by tax 
authorities (OECD, 2013a:47).   
 
A hybrid instrument is understood to be an instrument that combines the characteristics of 
two financial instruments, namely, a debt instrument and an equity instrument. Due to the 
blend of debt and equity characteristics in these instruments, these instruments are capable of 
being viewed and treated differently by different tax jurisdictions, either as debt or as equity 
(Johannesen, 2014:40; OECD, 2012:7). This inconsistent tax treatment by jurisdictions can 
create the potential for tax benefits to be derived by the parties to the instrument (being the 
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party issuing the instrument and the party to whom it was issued) through use of these 
instruments (Johannesen, 2014:40).   
 
The increasing use of these instruments by multinational groups has caused governments to 
take action and has resulted in international papers being released on hybrid instruments 
(Buettner, 2014:5). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(‗OECD‘) is an international organisation with 34 member countries that work together to 
address economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation, including in the 
arena of taxation (OECD, 2012:2). The OECD has been providing solutions for tax 
authorities to tackle aggressive tax planning for many years. Specifically in relation to hybrid 
instruments, the OECD first mentioned mismatch situations in its 2010 report titled 
―Addressing Tax Risks Involving Bank Losses‖. In 2012, the OECD released a paper titled 
―Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Tax Policy and Compliance Issues‖ which addressed 
hybrid instruments and hybrid entities. The OECD also addressed hybrid mismatches in its 
2013 reports titled ―Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting‖ and ―Action Plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting‖. The 2013 reports were released in response to the problems of 
aggressive tax planning (which is considered to be tax avoidance) and the shifting of profits 
from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions. These tax concerns reached high political 
levels and became a key issue on the agenda of many countries worldwide (OECD, 2013a:6; 
OECD, 2014b). To date, the OECD has released papers on each of the proposed action plans 
noted in the 2013 reports (OECD, 2014c; OECD, 2014d). One of the action plans is specific 
to hybrid mismatch arrangements and the working paper on this action plan was released 
earlier in 2014 for global comment, titled ―BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the effects of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements (Recommendations for Domestic Laws)‖. An initial action plan 
deliverable was released later in 2014 titled ―Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
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Arrangements‖, with the final version being published during the latter part of 2015. While 
hybrid instruments are a global concern, it is still in its early stages of being resolved, with 
the OECD only recently publishing recommendations and other leading bodies like the UN 
Tax Committee yet to release their recommendations. Furthermore, numerous countries are 
still to introduce legislation addressing this tax planning technique (PwC, 2014).  
 
While South Africa is not a member of the OECD, it does have strong working relations with 
the OECD and has continued to remain involved in initiatives by the OECD (Ministry: 
Finance, Republic of South Africa & OECD, 2008; OECD, 2014e). Being a leading nation in 
Africa, South Africa plays a key role where base erosion and profit shifting in Africa is 
concerned. The many multinational groups operating in South Africa also adds to the 
relevance of the OECD‘s base erosion and profit shifting project to the country. In terms of 
addressing tax avoidance techniques, National Treasury has already introduced various pieces 
of legislation over the years and continues to amend this legislation. Examples include 
legislation on controlled foreign companies contained in section 9D, transfer pricing rules 
contained in section 31, general anti-avoidance rules contained in sections 80A to 80L, 
hybrid instrument deeming provisions contained in sections 8E and 8F and provisions on the 
limitation of the deductibility of interest contained in sections 23M and 23N of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‗the Income Tax Act‘). Some of the provisions were introduced and/or 
amended prior to any OECD base erosion and profit shifting reports or guidelines being 
released on them (Steyn, 2014). Specifically with respect to hybrid instruments, South Africa 
first introduced legislation on this in 1989, contained in section 8E, and amendments 
continued to be made to this legislation. Hybrid instruments remain an area of focus for the 
South African tax authorities, as indicated by the recent amendments that were made to 
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sections 8E and 8F and the introduction of section 8FA to the legislation. It is thus an area of 
importance for South African taxpayers.  
 
Research problem 
 
Statement of the problem 
 
With the increasing global awareness on hybrid instruments, several countries have 
introduced specific tax rules addressing such instruments. In addition, various 
recommendations have been made within the international tax fraternity on curbing the use of 
these instruments. The South African tax legislation too contains rules on hybrid instruments, 
and over the years significant amendments have been made to these rules. For instance, 
section 8F on hybrid debt instruments has been amended to such an extent that the amended 
section 8F bears no resemblance to the previous section 8F. Furthermore, entirely new 
provisions on hybrid interest were introduced into the Income Tax Act in section 8FA. While 
legislation often needs to be improved and updated in order to keep up with globalisation and 
changes to the commercial environment in which entities operate, such changes need to be 
adequately considered from the perspective of both taxpayers and tax authorities. 
International guidelines or best practice should also be taken into account. To a certain extent, 
principles and concepts surrounding cross-border transactions and operations that are 
contained within domestic legislation also need to be aligned with other countries in order to 
achieve a coherent approach against tax avoidance and remain globally competitive with 
respect to inward investment. 
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The purpose of this research report is to consider the domestic and global tax concerns of 
hybrid debt instruments; the global tax trends in addressing such concerns; and the 
development of South African legislation on hybrid debt instruments in light of these tax 
concerns and global tax trends. What constitutes a hybrid debt instrument; whether there is 
need for tax legislation addressing hybrid debt instruments; and how South Africa‘s stance 
compares to global practices and OECD recommendations are questions that are central to 
this report.  
 
The sub-problems  
 
1. The first sub-problem is establishing what constitutes a hybrid debt instrument. It is 
generally considered to be a debt instrument that combines both debt and equity 
characteristics. This broad description makes it a flexible instrument. It also means that 
the instrument can be created with unique terms and conditions and each hybrid debt 
instrument can differ vastly from another. Different countries have adopted different 
approaches on how to classify such instruments. For South African tax purposes, a 
specific definition has been included in the Act in section 8F. This definition is relevant 
as it determines whether an instrument falls within the hybrid debt instrument 
provisions of the Act. National Treasury has gone further than just defining a hybrid 
debt instrument for tax purposes and has also included a definition in section 8FA of 
the Act for what they consider to be hybrid interest.  
 
2. The second sub-problem is identifying the reasons for introducing hybrid debt 
legislation, which essentially revolves around the tax concerns and issues that such 
legislation is meant to address. If legislation is introduced in order to address a specific 
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problem, one first needs to establish what the problem is before one can establish 
whether that legislation is appropriate in terms of addressing that problem. Where 
hybrid debt legislation is concerned, there are domestic and international reasons for 
introducing such legislation, both linked to the claiming of interest deductions. From a 
domestic perspective, issues and concerns relating to the previous legislation on hybrid 
debt instruments created a need for amendments to the legislation. Globally, there has 
been increased focus on hybrid debt instruments and hybrid instruments in general have 
been identified by the OECD as a key pressure area. Many countries are concerned 
about the use of hybrid debt instruments in cross-border tax planning and tax arbitrage.  
 
3. The third sub-problem is considering what tax policy approaches are available or 
recommended for hybrid debt instruments and whether the provisions contained in the 
South African tax legislation are aligned with these. South Africa introduced legislation 
on hybrid instruments many years ago, well ahead of any international 
recommendations. This legislation has been significantly amended and broadened over 
the years. With hybrid instruments being highlighted as a global tax concern, more 
research has been undertaken on potential policy approaches and more countries have 
started introducing tax laws addressing hybrid debt instruments. While each country 
has a sovereign right to introduce its own tax laws taking its own country-specific 
factors into account, experience can still be drawn from other countries. South Africa‘s 
legislation should therefore be considered in light of global developments.  It must, 
however, be noted that recommendations were only recently released by the OECD in 
their final format. Furthermore, not all countries have introduced tax legislation on 
hybrid instruments. Tax policy is thus still in its early stages of development. 
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Scope and limitations 
 
This research report only covers hybrid debt instruments. It does not cover any other type of 
hybrid arrangement or financial instrument. Only the relevant aspects of South African 
legislation are taken into account, and specifically the current sections 8F and 8FA contained 
in the Income Tax Act. Only South African income tax implications are considered and not 
any other tax implications like value-added tax or securities transfer tax. While the practice of 
tax authorities in other countries is discussed, a detailed analysis of foreign legislation is not 
undertaken and a detailed comparison between South African legislation and the legislation 
of other countries is not performed. International tax guidelines are incorporated into the 
research report, although these are largely limited to guidelines published by the OECD. 
International tax principles, like territorial or source rules and controlled foreign corporation 
rules, which may be impacted by hybrid debt instrument rules are only discussed to a limited 
extent where required. Double taxation agreements and the implications thereof are not 
considered. Accounting principles fall outside the scope of this report.  
 
Methodology 
 
Research has been undertaken as a literature review. The sources of information included tax 
legislation, government releases, books, journals, articles, publications, websites and any 
other publicly available document or piece of reliable information relevant to the research. 
Both South African and international sources have been used. The findings of this literature 
review were used to compile this report. 
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CHAPTER TWO – The legal nature and classification of hybrid debt  
 
Introduction 
 
Hybrid debt combines the characteristics of both debt and equity. The definitions of debt and 
equity and their distinguishing features thus need to be understood in order to appreciate the 
definition of hybrid debt. From a corporate perspective, the distinction between debt and 
equity is driven by legal principles and tax principles were traditionally based on these legal 
principles. This chapter therefore explores the legal classification of debt and equity, 
including related challenges, and the definition of hybrid debt.  
 
Corporate funding – the debt/equity distinction 
 
In a corporate context, there are three main sources of capital available to companies; namely, 
internally-generated funds, debt and equity (Glen & Pinto, 1994:1). There are various factors 
that would influence a company‘s funding choice and each option has different implications 
on the company and its operations (Fan, Titman & Twite, 2012:23 and Glen & Pinto, 
1994:4). Where external funding is required, the choice is between debt and equity (National 
Treasury, 2013c:27).  
 
Debt is defined as funds borrowed by the company which the company is obliged to repay to 
the lender (Oxford English Dictionary and Merriam-Webster). Equity is an amount raised in 
capital markets by the company as a result of the issue of shares or common stock in the 
company, which gives the holder a right or interest in the company (Glen & Pinto, 1994:1 
and Merriam-Webster). These are considered broad definitions of the terms. Distinguishing 
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between the two forms of funding is inherently difficult and instruments cannot easily be 
classified into these two categories (Krahmal, 2005:103). It is, however, important to make 
this debt/equity distinction as different regulatory, financial reporting and tax implications 
arise as a result of the classification.  
 
Essentially, it is the terms and conditions attached to the funding instrument and the 
application of domestic laws that would determine its classification as debt or equity. 
Domestic laws may include corporate law, civil law, insolvency law, accounting law or 
similar and each set of laws may employ its own criteria in determining such classification. 
The labelling of an instrument under domestic law is considered to play a major role with 
respect to its classification for tax purposes (Schön et al, 2009:84). The decision for domestic 
law purposes often involves an evaluation of the instrument in order to identify debt and 
equity characteristics. In order to determine what are considered to be debt or equity 
characteristics, Green et al consider it useful to ascertain the core elements of ‗pure‘ debt and 
‗pure‘ equity (2012:11). Some of these (legal) elements are listed in the table below. For the 
purposes of this report, the term ―lender‖ refers to the person extending the debt funding to 
the company (i.e. the issuer of the debt instrument) and the term ―shareholder‖ refers to the 
person contributing the equity funding and holding the equity instrument or shares in the 
company.  
 
Debt Equity 
The lender does not have a say in the affairs 
of the company. They are the suppliers of 
capital rather than the owners of capital. 
The shareholder has ownership and voting 
rights and thereby has a say in the affairs of 
the company. 
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The return on the instrument is certain as 
the lender is entitled to receive fixed, 
ongoing returns by way of interest, 
irrespective of the performance or financial 
position of the company. This is a legally 
enforceable right of the lender. 
Returns, received by way of dividends, are 
dependent on the profitability of the 
company. If a return is paid out, the amount 
could vary between minimal and substantial, 
depending on the performance of the 
company. 
The capital amount of the instrument, which 
equates to the funding extended, is 
repayable as agreed between the parties to 
the instrument. However, repayment is 
limited to the capital amount only. 
There is no obligation to repay the capital 
amount raised and no maturity is attached to 
the instrument. Should the company wish to 
repurchase the instrument or shares from the 
shareholder, the amount paid is generally 
based on the market value of the company 
and thus has no bearing on the capital 
amount raised. 
The lender has a preferred ranking in the 
event of distributions made on liquidation 
of the company. 
There is no guarantee of distributions to the 
shareholder in the event of liquidation of the 
company as the shareholder ranks in the last 
class where this is concerned.  
(Boltar J,1995:252-3; Brincker, 2011:B2.1; Dauds, 2007:28; De Mooij, 2012:496; Green et 
al, 2012:12; and Krahmal, 2005:106) 
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Debt/Equity (legal) classification from a practical perspective 
 
The above-mentioned elements are considered the main distinguishing characteristics in 
classifying an instrument as debt or equity. They are widely applied by various countries 
around the globe. Evidence of their application in practice can be found by reviewing the 
principles applied by countries in distinguishing between debt and equity. One such review 
can be found in an analysis performed by the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public 
Finance (‗the Max Planck Institute‘). The legal systems of several countries were analysed; 
namely, Brazil, Germany, France, Greece, Holland, Austria, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. It therefore incorporated both developing and developed countries, including 
developed countries that were considered to have a well-established tax and legal system in 
place.  
 
The analysis indicated that, for all examined countries, the classification of financial 
instruments as equity is primarily driven by ―the legally binding association of persons under 
corporate or partnership law for a common (commercial) purpose‖ (Schön et al, 2014:149). 
Financial contributions by these persons, referred to as the partners or shareholders, under the 
partnership agreement or company statute to which they are party, are considered to be 
equity. The creditor, on the other hand, is ―connected to the enterprise (company/partnership) 
via a loan agreement, which does not mandate the pursuit of a common purpose but rather the 
exchange of performance for consideration‖ (Schön et al, 2014:149).  
 
The following general principles were noted in the analysis by Schön et al in respect of the 
partners or shareholders (i.e. the holders of equity): 
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 The holders of equity have joint control of the assets and the operations of the 
enterprise, which can be delegated to managers. They also have certain participation 
rights (like rights of management, voting and control), depending on the enterprise 
and type of involvement. 
 The holders of equity share in the profits and losses of the business; have rights on 
liquidation of the enterprise; and are jointly liable to the creditors of the enterprise (to 
the extent of their capital contribution or to an unlimited extent). 
 On insolvency, the holders of equity have the lowest ranking in terms of claims, with 
further differentiation within this category being possible. 
 Distributions to the holders of equity are subject to the impact on creditors and level 
of indebtedness or leverage of the enterprise. The holders of equity do not have an 
enforceable legal right or a right to sue for payment of returns, rather it is dependent 
on the profits of the company (2014:149-150; 191).  
 
The following converse principles were noted by Schön et al in respect of the creditors: 
 The creditors do not have joint proprietary or corporate law rights to the assets and 
operations of the enterprise. This is the case even if it is possible to grant such rights 
on a contractual basis. 
 The creditors have a fixed right to the repayment of interest and of the capital sum 
extended, which is often secured in some way and enforceable by law. The debt has a 
limited term. 
 The creditors have a priority claim on insolvency of the enterprise, with each set of 
creditors being capable of further ranking differentiations. 
 Payments to creditors are not subject to any limitations or prohibitions that are based 
on capital maintenance, solvency or similar (2014:149-150; 191). 
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The analysis by the Max Planck Institute thus confirms that the elements listed in the table 
above can be applied both theoretically and practically. This, however, holds true for 
instruments that clearly comprise ‗pure‘ debt or ‗pure‘ equity characteristics, which is not 
always the case. Legal deviations are allowed in practice, as evidenced by the Max Planck 
Institute analysis, which adds challenges to the classification of debt and equity in practice. 
 
Debt/Equity (legal) classification practices in South Africa 
 
The terms ―debt‖ and ―equity‖ have not been specifically defined for South African corporate 
law purposes. Based on a history of established case law, where terms are not specifically 
defined, their ordinary dictionary meaning should apply. As indicated above, the dictionary 
meanings of these terms are fairly broad and in practice may not easily be applied to financial 
instruments. Some of the fundamental domestic law elements of debt and equity are as 
follows: 
 
Debt Equity 
The lender has a creditor relationship with 
the company, making the lender‘s rights 
contractual in nature. The instrument has a 
fixed tenure. 
 
A legal relationship between the 
shareholder and the company must exist, 
which involves a complex of rights and 
duties. The shareholder remains a member 
of the company as long as the shareholder 
holds the equity instrument; and the term of 
the equity instrument is perpetual. 
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The instrument is in any agreed form. 
 
The instrument is in the form of a share 
certificate, as prescribed by the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 (‗the Companies Act‘).  
The lender has a right to receive, over the 
life of the instrument, a return in the form 
of interest at a predetermined rate, 
calculated based on the issue price of the 
instrument and payable at fixed times. This 
right to interest does not depend on any 
declaration or on the profitability of the 
company, and payment is made without 
regard to these two aspects. 
The shareholder participates in the profits 
of the company that are available for 
distribution as dividends. These dividends 
are subject to declaration by the company 
(by its directors) and subject to the liquidity 
and solvency of the company.  
The lender usually holds security in lieu of 
the funds lent. Upon liquidation, the 
funding may be secured and the lender may 
hold a preferential claim, although this is 
subject to the claims of other creditors that 
hold higher ranking security. 
 
The shareholder does not hold any security 
in respect of the instrument. The 
shareholder does not hold a preferential 
right upon liquidation of the company but 
has a right to equal participation in the 
remaining assets of the company after it 
has settled debts and liquidation costs.  
(de Koker & Brincker, 2010:8.2.3-8.2.4) 
 
The domestic law criteria are thus in line with those applied globally. However, as is the case 
globally, legal deviations over the years have caused the lines between debt and equity to be 
blurred. Financial instruments are now placed on a continuum ranging from what was 
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traditionally considered to be ‗pure‘ equity to what was traditionally considered to be ‗pure‘ 
debt. 
 
Classification challenges – deviations from „pure‟ funding 
 
Financial innovation over time has resulted in instruments containing a mix of both debt and 
equity characteristics (Krahmal, 2005:103). This innovation makes the debt/equity 
classification a challenging task and one that is subject to interpretation (Brincker, 2011:B2.2; 
De Mooij, 2012:496). While the elements and principles contained above can still be used as 
guidelines, in practice the distinguishing lines can become quite vague. In addition, the legal 
systems of countries have developed differently in terms of addressing or allowing the 
deviation of financial instruments from the general principles of debt and equity (Schön et al, 
2014:150). Differences in the application of law by countries also exists (Schön et al, 
2014:157). This holds true for South Africa too. For instance, the Companies Act allows 
companies to design their own debt and equity instruments and combine debt and equity 
features (Lewis, 2013:1). In accordance with the Companies Act, certain classes of shares 
may have preferences, rights and limitations based on any objectively ascertainable fact (van 
der Zwan & Huisman, 2012:4). The different legal systems and legal application of countries 
thus contribute to classification challenges and to differing conclusions being drawn by 
countries on the classification of an instrument.    
 
The Max Planck Institute illustrated the variations in legal systems using a silent partnership 
arrangement whereby both the silent partner and the general partner are the contributors of 
capital but the operations are run by the general partner with the silent partner not necessarily 
having any proprietary participation or decision-making rights. The silent partner could also 
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share in the profits but not losses of the enterprise. Based on their analysis, the status and 
legal rights of the partners and partnership differed depending on the laws of each specific 
country. In certain jurisdictions like England, a partnership was not considered an 
independent legal entity while in others it was considered a body corporate. In some 
jurisdictions, like Germany, partners could avoid participating in losses while in other 
jurisdictions, like France, such an arrangement was classified as a participating loan (Schön 
et al, 2014:150-151).  
 
Despite all of the examined countries applying the same set of debt/equity classification 
principles, contrasting conclusions can be drawn by these countries on the classification of a 
particular instrument that deviates from some of the traditional characteristics of ‗pure‘ debt 
and ‗pure‘ equity. The greater the deviation from the traditional characteristics, the less 
relevant the traditional classification guidelines become. In practice, it is possible for 
deviations to occur to the extent that a holder of equity could have rights falling within the 
general principles of debt or to the extent that a contractual entitlement could be classified as 
equity.  
 
As quoted by Johannesen, ―In exchange for capital, corporations can offer investors any set 
of rights that can be described by words, subject to any conceivable set of qualifications, and 
in consideration of any conceivable set of offsetting obligations‖ (2012:2). Between the two 
spectrums of traditional debt and traditional equity lies what is termed as hybrid finance 
(Schön et al, 2014:165).  
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Hybrid finance definitions 
 
In addition to references within corporate environments to debt funding and equity funding, 
one will also find references to hybrid funding. The terms ―hybrid finance‖, ―hybrid debt‖ or 
―hybrid instrument‖ do not appear to have globally accepted definitions. The ordinary 
dictionary meaning of ―hybrid‖ is something that combines or is composed of two different 
elements (Oxford English Dictionary, Merriam-Webster). By applying this dictionary 
definition to external funding obtained by a company, hybrid finance would refer to finance 
that combines the elements of both debt and equity. Similarly, hybrid debt or a hybrid 
instrument would refer to one that contains the features of both debt and equity. This is in line 
with definitions for hybrid instruments and hybrid securities (with securities being an 
American term used synonymously for instrument) that can be found in online dictionaries 
like Investopedia, InvestorWords and RiskGlossary. It is also in line with the understanding 
of various international bodies, tax authorities, practitioners and academics, as referred to in 
this research report. A hybrid debt instrument is by inference a debt instrument that contains 
some equity characteristics and vice versa for a hybrid equity instrument. This inference 
conforms with National Treasury‘s view that a hybrid debt instrument is debt in legal form 
but has equity features (National Treasury, 2004:24). This research report deals only with 
hybrid debt instruments, which are understood for the purposes of this research report to be 
debt instruments in legal form that have certain equity elements present within their terms 
and conditions. 
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Features of hybrid debt instruments in practice 
 
Due to the broad definition of a hybrid debt instrument, it can be created through a 
combination of many different terms or conditions. A simplistic overview of some of the 
terms and conditions of hybrid debt instruments that are currently used in practice is included 
below. In practice, contractual clauses contained within different hybrid debt instruments can 
vary extensively and these clauses can become extremely complex. Parties also tend to 
structure hybrid debt instruments in order to benefit from certain aspects of both debt and 
equity, thus adding to the complexity.    
 
Debt with deferral features 
This is a debt instrument that contains a clause allowing the company to defer the payment of 
interest. The lender may have limited rights where deferred interest is concerned. The clause 
could also contain an option for permanent cancellation of the obligation to repay interest or 
deferred interest should certain conditions be met. Under these circumstances, the lender 
forfeits the right to claim payment. Alternatively, the interest or deferred interest may be 
capped to a maximum amount (Green et al, 2012:22). 
 
Variable rate instruments 
These instruments allow for a variable rate of interest to be paid. The agreement often 
contains a formula for calculating the interest that is to be paid. The result of applying the 
specified formula is that no interest is paid during periods where the company does not make 
a profit and a considerable amount of interest is paid during periods where adequate profits 
are made. Similarly, the formula can be linked to the cash reserves of the company as 
opposed to profits made (Brincker, 2011:B2.3). 
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Scale or ratchet debt 
These instruments contain interest rates that change at specified tranches within the tenure of 
the debt. For instance, the interest rate could start at a negligible rate of 1%, thereafter 
increase to 5% for the next tranche and end with a 40% rate for the remaining tranche. The 
converse could also apply with high interest rates at the start that are later reduced (Brincker, 
2011:B2.3). 
 
Subordinated debt 
Subordination clauses relate to the ranking of the debt where the creditors of the company are 
concerned. The debt would rank behind some or all other creditors, depending on who the 
subordination is in favour of (ASX, 2014).  
 
Contingent or convertible capital 
One type of contingent capital is debt that automatically converts to equity should certain 
conditions be met or events occur. Examples of such conditions or events would be if the 
company‘s profits fall below a certain amount or the company‘s debt ratio exceeds a certain 
threshold (Green et al, 2012:19;25). Alternatively, if the company has not made sufficient 
profits, the company could have the option to satisfy a creditor‘s claim on interest payments 
through the issue of shares (Schön et al, 2014:160). Another type of contingent capital is 
where the instrument can be substituted with one that has different terms attached to it (Green 
et al, 2012:19;25).  
 
Perpetual debt 
Perpetual debt instruments do not contain an obligation to repay the capital amount of the 
loan funding. The debt remains in existence indefinitely and never has to be repaid, except on 
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liquidation (Brincker, 2011:B2.3). 
 
Participating loans 
Under a participating loan arrangement, the lender has certain participation rights. The 
payment of compensation can be based on performance, financial results or an index. The 
lender may also have to participate in losses. Participation rights can also extend to the latent 
gains of the company or enterprise. The repayment of the capital amount of the debt can be 
modified based on the participation rights (Schön et al, 2014:160). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Historically, corporations would choose between ‗pure‘ debt and ‗pure‘ equity funding, with 
each having its own commercial, legal and tax implications. Various legal features were used 
to distinguish between these two forms of funding. However, due to financial innovation over 
time, corporations have combined different features of debt and equity in order to create 
funding instruments that suit specific requirements and integrate the beneficial features of 
both forms of funding. This new form of hybrid funding has created classification challenges 
from both a legal and tax perspective. From a tax perspective, tax classifications play a 
crucial role in determining which tax rules are to be applied to the funding. 
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CHAPTER THREE – The tax classification of debt and equity and its 
related concerns  
 
Introduction 
 
The tax rules to be applied to a funding instrument are generally based on the tax 
classification of that funding instrument as debt or as equity (which has traditionally been 
based on the legal classification). Different tax rules are applied to each form of funding. 
Such classification hence determines the resulting tax implications for both taxpayers and tax 
authorities. This chapter discusses these tax implications and illustrates the importance of 
debt/equity classifications from a tax perspective using the South African tax treatments of 
debt and of equity. 
 
Debt/Equity classification – relevance from a tax perspective 
 
The principal tax concern from a practical perspective is the classification of hybrid financial 
instruments as debt or as equity (Schön et al, 2014:188). The distinction between debt and 
equity has created numerous issues for countries from both a domestic and international tax 
perspective. It is the subject of many discussions within the tax world and international 
bodies, like the International Fiscal Association, have placed importance on this debt/equity 
topic (Schön et al, 2014:147). The OECD, the International Monetary Fund and the United 
Nations are also amongst the international bodies that have included the debt/equity issue on 
their agendas. Specifically for tax purposes, the debt/equity classification is of importance as 
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tax systems typically classify financial instruments as either debt or equity and different tax 
treatments arise as a result of the classification (Johannesen, 2012:2).  
 
Where corporate tax is concerned, there is a double layer of taxation levied on equity as a 
result of both the company and shareholder being subject to tax (Schön et al, 2014:164). The 
company is subject to tax on its profits, and it is out of these after-tax profits that a return on 
equity (i.e. dividend) is paid. In addition, this dividend can be subject to further tax at 
shareholder level (i.e. dividends tax or similar), albeit at a reduced rate. Debt, on the other 
hand, does not create the ‗double layer‘ tax concern due to the returns (i.e. interest) paid on 
debt funding often being deductible in computing the taxable profits of the company. It is 
thus the fact that a return on equity funding is not deductible for tax purposes while a return 
on debt funding is deductible that is key to the debt/equity issue (Schön et al, 2014:180;199 
and De Mooij, 2012:490). According to De Mooij, the reasoning behind allowing a deduction 
for interest and not dividends is due to interest being considered a cost of doing business 
whereas equity returns reflect business profits (2012:496). This favourable tax treatment for 
debt creates a bias towards debt funding for companies (De Mooij, 2012:490). Where the 
parties to a financial instrument are tax resident, and hence subject to tax, in different 
countries, distortions may occur in taxing these cross-border instruments due to inconsistent 
tax treatments being applied by the different countries. This is explained in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
 
While the tax treatment of debt differs to that of equity, it must be noted that tax is only one 
of the various factors influencing corporations‘ choice between debt and equity funding. 
Several research papers have been published on the various factors that impact this choice, 
including one authored by Glen & Pinto and another by De Mooij. Johannesen pointed out 
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that some firms may use such instruments for non-tax reasons due to other beneficial 
characteristics present in the instruments. The extent of tax-driven financial innovation and 
the choice of financial instruments by multinational groups in the absence of taxes is, 
however, considered a difficult concept to quantify (Johannessen, 2014:46). This research 
report will not delve into the details of non-tax driven funding choices. 
 
Debt versus Equity – South African income tax implications 
 
Like many other countries around the world, the South African tax system taxes debt and 
equity under two different sets of rules, generally based on their legal form (National 
Treasury, 2004:19). Once an instrument is analysed and characterised under South African 
law, the South African tax treatment will follow such characterisation (de Koker & Brincker, 
2010: 8.6.11). Hence instruments qualifying as debt will be subject to tax rules that apply to 
debt, and likewise for equity instruments (National Treasury, 2004:19). In order to illustrate 
the differences in the tax rules applying to these two forms of finance, a simplistic overview 
of the South African normal tax implications of ‗pure‘ debt and of ‗pure‘ equity within a 
corporate context is included hereafter. Detailed explanations on these tax implications fall 
outside the scope of this report. 
 
Debt funding income tax implications 
 
The income tax implications listed below arise where interest-bearing loan funding has been 
extended on capital account by a South African tax resident company to another South 
African tax resident company (all section references are to the Income Tax Act and all 
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paragraph references are to the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act on the determination 
of taxable capital gains and assessed capital losses).  
 
Lender company implications 
 Loan receivable – The funds extended will fall within the definition of ―asset‖ under 
paragraph 1. Per paragraph 20(1)(a), a base cost equal to the amount of funds extended, 
being the expenditure actually incurred in respect of the creation of that asset, will be 
established (SARS, 2015b:763). 
 Repayments – Capital repayments will either reduce the base cost of the loan receivable 
per paragraph 20(3)(b) or it will be considered a part-disposal subject to paragraphs 
11(1)(b), 33 and 35 (SARS, 2015b:764,766). Redemptions usually occur at face value, 
hence no capital gain or loss should arise (i.e. the net effect of the repayment should 
merely be a reduction in base cost). 
 Interest earned – The amount received will in all likelihood constitute ―interest‖ as 
defined in section 24J of the Act and will hence be specifically included in gross income 
per section 24J(3).  The quantum and timing of the inclusion in gross income will be 
determined with reference to the provisions of section 24J. Section 24J effectively 
spreads the interest (as defined) over the period or term of the financial arrangement by 
compounding the interest over fixed accrual periods using a predetermined rate referred 
to as the ―yield to maturity‖ (which is effectively the rate on a day-to-day basis over the 
agreed term). Section 24J deems the holder of an instrument to have accrued amounts of 
interest in a relevant year of assessment, as calculated under section 24J principles 
(ENSafrica, 2015). Should the provisions of section 24J not apply to the debt, any 
interest received or accrued will be regarded as gross income in accordance with the 
gross income definition contained in section 1.  
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Borrower company implications 
 Loan liability – No income tax implications will arise as a result of the receipt of funds 
being a capital receipt (being fixed capital to be held with a degree of permanency in 
order to support the income-earning structure of the business, per various case law 
principles) (SARS, 2015b:17,21).  
 Repayments – No income tax implications will arise (being expenditure of a capital 
nature, which is not in respect of an ―asset‖ as defined) (Income Tax Act). 
 Interest incurred – Interest incurred in the production of ―income‖ (as defined), derived 
from the carrying on of a trade, should qualify for a tax deduction in terms of section 
24J. The quantum and timing of the deduction would be determined with reference to the 
provisions of section 24J (whereby a yield to maturity basis will be applied, as described 
above). If the provisions of section 24J do not apply to the debt, the interest incurred 
could be claimed as a deduction under section 11(a), provided the necessary 
requirements are met (i.e. ―income‖ as defined must be derived from the carrying on of a 
trade; the interest must be actually incurred in the production of that ―income‖; and the 
expense must not be of a capital nature) (ENSafrica, 2015 and Income Tax Act). 
 
Summary of the income tax implications associated with debt funding 
Interest incurred by a borrower company that qualifies for deduction would result in a tax 
saving at the corporate tax rate of 28%. Interest income, on the other hand, would be included 
in the lender company‘s gross income and would therefore attract income tax at the corporate 
tax rate of 28%. It is therefore apparent that, under normal circumstances, the combined net 
tax effect of the funding arrangement should be neutral as the tax saving achieved by the 
borrower company should equate to the tax suffered by the lender company.  
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Equity funding income tax implications 
 
The income tax implications listed below arise where funding has been extended by a South 
African tax resident company to another South African tax resident company by means of a 
purchase of ordinary shares in the company, which is to be held on capital account (all 
section references are to the Income Tax Act and all paragraph references are to the Eighth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act on the determination of taxable capital gains and assessed 
capital losses). 
 
Shareholder implications 
 Share acquisition – Shares fall within the definition of ―asset‖ under paragraph 1 of 
the Eighth Schedule. Per paragraph 20, a base cost equal to the expenditure actually 
incurred in respect of the acquisition of that asset together with any qualifying 
expenditure will be established (note: special rules per paragraph 32 can be applied in 
computing the base cost of shares) (SARS, 2015b:39,176, 303).  
 Share disposals – share buy-backs, sales or any other type of disposal will fall within 
paragraph 11(1)(a) (SARS, 2015b:76,641). The amount received on disposal will be 
treated as proceeds per paragraph 35 (SARS, 2015b:341,641). The difference between 
the proceeds and the base cost of the shares being disposed of will result in a capital 
gain or loss (SARS, 2015b:30). It is generally expected that the amount of proceeds 
would be influenced by the value of the shares at the time of disposal rather than the 
initial subscription amount, thus a capital gain or loss is expected to arise. Subject to 
any specific anti-avoidance provision like paragraph 19, the capital gain or loss will 
be used to determine the person‘s taxable capital gain (through application of 
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paragraphs 3 to 10), and would effectively be subject to a tax rate of 18.6% (SARS, 
2015b:699,61-71).   
 Company distributions – distributions by the company in respect of a share will either 
be a dividend (refer below for implications) or a repayment of ―contributed tax 
capital‖, a defined term in section 1 (SARS, 2015b:611-612). Repayments of 
contributed tax capital will reduce the base cost attributable to the share, per 
paragraph 76B, with any excess giving rise to a capital gain (SARS, 
2015b:618,621,624).  
 Dividends – These amounts will fall within the gross income definition in section 1 on 
receipt or accrual. In most instances, dividends should qualify for exemption under 
section 10(1)(k). Per section 64F, the shareholder should not be subject to dividends 
tax at 15%, being a South African tax resident company (Income Tax Act).  
 
Company implications 
 Equity injection – The issue of shares by a company would not be considered a 
disposal of an ―asset‖ based on paragraph 11(2)(b) (SARS, 2015b:82,85).The amount 
will be recorded by the company as contributed tax capital (SARS, 2015b:614-616). 
No further tax implications should arise. 
 Share buy-backs and company distributions – Repurchases by a company of its own 
shares and other forms of company distributions will either reduce the contributed tax 
capital balance relating to that class of shares or will be considered a dividend paid by 
the company (SARS, 2015b:613,616). Outside of administrative obligations, no 
negative income tax implications should arise.   
 Dividends – The company will be subject to certain obligations in terms of the 
dividends tax rules contained in sections 64D to 64N. These obligations could range 
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from administrative in nature (where no dividends tax arises and only reporting 
obligations are placed on the company), to withholding obligations (where the 
dividend is subject to dividends tax), to being liable for dividends tax (in the instance 
of a dividend in specie which is subject to dividends tax) (Income Tax Act). Where 
dividends are paid to South African resident companies, no negative income tax 
implications should arise.  
 
Summary of income tax implications associated with equity funding 
A company receiving equity funding and paying returns on that equity funding will not enjoy 
any tax benefits associated with that funding and nor will it suffer any adverse income tax 
implications. The shareholder would not suffer any taxes on the dividends and (capital) 
distributions that are not in excess of the base cost of the shares. Any capital gains realised on 
(capital) distributions and share disposals would attract tax at an effective rate of 18.6%. The 
combined net effect of equity funding is likely to be an outflow of taxes due to tax suffered 
by the shareholder. Equity funding thus has the potential to give rise to positive tax revenues 
for tax authorities.  
 
Debt versus Equity – tax revenues earned by tax authorities 
 
Based on South African tax rules, there is a clear difference in the income tax treatment of 
debt and of equity from each party‘s perspective (i.e. lender/shareholder compared to 
borrower/company). The provider of the funds is likely to prefer equity funding as the returns 
are not taxable, while the recipient of the funds is likely to prefer debt funding due to the tax 
saving on the deductible returns. The overall impact on tax revenues earned by tax authorities 
(SARS where South Africa is concerned) is, however, a difficult concept to conclude on. 
35 
 
Based on the simplistic representation above, it could be argued that the net difference 
between these two forms of funding (where the parties to the instrument are South African 
tax residents) is not a significant one. However, in practice many other factors can influence 
the outcome. When incorporating additional dynamics, debt funding provides various 
opportunities for reducing the aggregate tax exposure of all taxpayers concerned.  
 
One such dynamic is loss positions. As pointed out in the report by the Max Planck Institute, 
where companies are in loss positions, funding choices can be used to exploit these losses. 
Tax laws do not generally allow the vertical and horizontal offsetting of losses on revenue 
streams and between parties, like the shifting of losses from a company to its shareholders. 
Tax laws also do not generally provide a negative tax or tax benefit to taxpayers in loss 
positions (Schön et al, 2014:201). For these reasons, taxpayers often seek ways of utilising 
losses and hence apply tax planning to areas like funding choices.  
 
Another dynamic is the involvement of parties that are not subject to tax (Schön et al, 
2014:183). The reference to parties that are not subject to tax includes a party that is located 
in another tax jurisdiction and hence not subject to tax in the same tax jurisdiction as the 
party claiming the tax deduction; and tax-exempt or similar bodies that are located in the 
same tax jurisdiction but not subject to any tax, for example a public benefit organisation or 
government body.  
 
Depending on the combination of the various dynamics, debt funding has a much greater 
potential to harm a tax jurisdiction through lost tax revenues. This loss of tax revenues is 
largely due to the fact that the borrower may qualify for an income tax deduction whereas the 
lender may not necessarily be subject to income tax on the interest income. This is especially 
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true for cross border funding as tax revenues may have to be shared with or even fully 
attributed to another tax jurisdiction. The global concern on hybrid funding hence relates 
more to cross-border hybrid instruments than to domestic hybrid instruments. Cross-border 
hybrid debt is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Depending on whether an instrument is classified as debt or as equity for tax purposes, 
different tax implications would arise for the parties to the instrument, as debt and equity 
trigger distinctly different tax rules. This emphasises the importance of the tax classification 
of hybrid instruments as debt or as equity. In addition, the potential for returns on debt to be 
deductible, which would give rise to a tax saving for the party receiving the funds, together 
with the opportunities to utilise debt funding in tax planning techniques creates a preference 
for debt funding, especially in a cross-border context. This creates a concern for tax 
authorities regarding the utilisation of hybrid debt instruments. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – Cross-border hybrid debt and its related concerns  
 
Introduction 
 
While the bias towards debt funding exists both within a domestic and international context, 
cross-border hybrid debt instruments offer more opportunities for tax planning and hence 
pose a greater risk to tax authorities. This chapter explores the common tax planning 
techniques utilised by multinationals in cross-border funding instruments, thereby explaining 
the reasons for the global concern on hybrid debt funding. 
 
Cross-border tax planning opportunities 
 
In addition to the difference in the tax treatment of debt compared to equity, from an 
international tax perspective, the assignment of taxation rights between jurisdictions is 
generally of significance. Where corporate funding is concerned, returns on debt are largely 
taxed in the state of residence of the lender (i.e. where the interest income is received and 
recognised) while equity returns are commonly taxed in the state where the operations are 
based (i.e. where the profits out of which the dividends are distributed is earned) (Schön et al, 
2014:164,203). Hence the type of funding dictates which jurisdiction has the right to tax the 
return on the cross-border funding instrument. From a tax planning perspective, this creates 
an opportunity to manipulate the rates of return on funding and thereby shift profits between 
different tax jurisdictions. It also brings into play the relevance of the corporate tax rates of 
each jurisdiction as well as applicable withholding taxes that are levied on the different 
income streams (De Mooij, 2012:496). The higher the corporate tax rate, the more incentive 
there is to claim deductions in order to reduce taxable profits and to shift profits out of that 
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jurisdiction. High withholding tax rates on returns paid may reduce this incentive and may 
also impact the choice of the funding instrument. The use of leveraging and hybrid debt 
instruments as well as the creation of complex structures in order to secure tax benefits are 
explained in more detail below. 
 
Leveraging  
 
Leveraging is essentially the funding of a company using debt (rather than equity). The more 
debt funding a corporation has, the more leveraged it is (Oxford English Dictionary). As a tax 
planning tool, multinational groups can choose to leverage subsidiaries (hosts or recipients of 
funding) located in countries with a high corporate tax rate in order to benefit from tax 
deductions on the interest of the loan funding extended (De Mooij, 2012:493-494). In this 
manner, a deduction for interest is obtained in a high-tax jurisdiction, thereby reducing the 
profits that are subject to tax in that jurisdiction and achieving a greater tax saving. On the 
other hand, multinationals can choose to provide equity funding to subsidiaries that are 
subject to a low tax rate on profits as there is a limited need to manage the tax exposure on 
profits in such a jurisdiction. The greater the disparity in corporate tax rates, the greater the 
incentive to manage the debt/equity funding ratio (De Mooij, 2012:493-494).  
 
Tax benefits can be further enhanced by selecting a favourable counterparty jurisdiction for 
the funding returns to flow to. The tax suffered on income that flows to the funding company 
located in the counterparty tax jurisdiction (referred to henceforth as the home country) 
depends on the country-specific tax legislation. Generally, interest income is subject to tax 
while no or limited additional tax is suffered on dividend income (Johannesen, 2012:20). 
Multinationals can therefore select low-tax jurisdictions for interest income to flow to, 
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thereby reducing the tax suffered on such income streams (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 
2012:9 and OECD, 2013b:16). With dividend income, the income can be directed to 
jurisdictions that offer tax exemptions or credits for such income, resulting in no or little tax 
being suffered (OECD, 2013a:37,41). The tax benefit to the (corporate) group would 
therefore be the net effect of the tax impact in the host country and the tax impact in the home 
country (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 2012:9 and De Mooij, 2012:492). The tax impact 
would include any withholding taxes levied by the host jurisdiction and withholding tax 
credits provided by the home jurisdiction.  
 
Multinational groups can expand on leveraging benefits and reduce or eliminate any tax 
suffered on the funding arrangement by utilising hybrid finance like hybrid debt instruments. 
When used as a cross-border tax planning tool, hybrid debt instruments are commonly treated 
as debt in one country and equity in another country. The funding is extended between 
companies in tax jurisdictions that allow for a tax deduction to be claimed in the host country 
and no tax to be levied on the corresponding income in the home country (OECD, 2012:7). 
An example was used by the OECD to illustrate cross-border hybrid debt funding, which is 
reproduced below. 
 
Example from OECD report (OECD, 2012:8-9): 
A company resident in country B (‗B Co‘) is funded by a company resident in country A (‗A 
Co‘) with an instrument that qualifies as equity in country A but as debt in country B. If 
current payments are made under the instrument, they are deductible interest expenses for B 
Co under country B tax law. The corresponding receipts are treated as exempt dividends for 
country A tax purposes. As a result, a net deduction arises in country B without a 
corresponding income inclusion in country A.  
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The OECD expanded on the above example in a later report issued in 2014. In the updated 
example, country B grants a tax deduction for the payments made under the instrument and 
country A does not tax those receipts or grants some form of tax relief (an exemption, 
exclusion, indirect tax credit, or similar) for those receipts, hence achieving the same effect as 
the example above (OECD, 2014a:59). Since these structures often involve and affect many 
countries, a global impact does arise and global concerns are raised. 
 
Layered group structures 
 
Johannesen has found that the use of hybrid instruments by parties located in different tax 
jurisdictions that view the instruments differently for tax purposes, is always feasible for one 
of the parties to the instrument and, in certain situations, is feasible for both parties (2012:4). 
Creating a multi-tier structure whereby more companies (often referred to as conduits) 
located in different tax jurisdictions, are included in the financing arrangement allows a 
multinational group to take advantage of differences in tax treatments by third or more 
countries (Johannesen, 2012:5). According to Johannesen, multinational groups are noted for 
involving multiple jurisdictions in their tax planning techniques, for instance the use of tax 
41 
 
haven countries as finance headquarters for the group (Johannesen, 2014:44). Johannesen 
found that using a conduit financing structure has the ability to ensure that the hybrid 
instrument is treated as debt in the country of the ultimate user of that finance (host country) 
and as equity in the country of the original provider of finance (home country) (2012:26). 
Conduit structures thus virtually guarantee a tax benefit. The diagrams contained hereunder 
were used by Johannesen to illustrate such structures (2012: Figure 3 and Figure 4). Note that 
an example similar to Johannesen‘s single conduit hybrid structure was also used by the 
OECD in their 2014 report (OECD, 2014a:59).  
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Layered structures involving hybrid debt instruments can be used as an effective tax planning 
tool, affecting multiple countries and hence giving rise to a global concern. According to the 
OECD, current tax rules applied by countries promote the use debt funding (OECD, 
2013a:43). The OECD stated in their 2014 report that, while mismatches in the tax treatment 
of hybrid instruments could be due to various reasons, the most frequent is the debt versus 
equity classification by the jurisdictions (2014a:33-34).  
 
Global impact of hybrid tax planning mechanisms 
 
In practice, various forms of cross-border hybrid arrangements can exist through the use of 
hybrid entities and hybrid instruments. Although hybrid arrangements other than hybrid debt 
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instruments fall outside the scope of this report, discussions on the global impact generally 
refer to the broader banner of hybrid arrangements and not specifically to hybrid debt 
instruments, hence the references below are to hybrid arrangements. 
 
Many countries have had to contend with hybrid arrangements and these arrangements often 
achieve what the OECD refers to as double non-taxation in the countries concerned or they 
achieve a tax deferral which can be economically similar to double non-taxation. The OECD 
is concerned with any hybrid arrangement that results in a mismatch for tax purposes. The 
OECD describes such hybrid mismatch arrangements as arrangements that exploit the 
differences in the tax treatment between two or more countries, producing a mismatch in the 
tax outcomes in the respective countries and thereby lowering the aggregate tax burden of the 
parties to the arrangement (OECD, 2012:5,11 and OECD, 2014a:29). One such mismatch 
occurs when the proportion of a payment, measurable in money but excluding valuation 
differences, that is deductible in one jurisdiction does not correspond to the proportion of the 
inclusion in income by any other jurisdiction(s). Such a mismatch is typical of a hybrid debt 
instrument that is used as a tax planning tool. Hybrid debt instruments are one of several 
hybrid arrangements that the OECD is concerned with. 
 
Where companies within a (corporate) group are located in different tax jurisdictions, the 
funding choice affects the total tax burden of the group (OECD, 2013a:43). Hybrid 
instruments reduce the overall tax revenue earned by tax authorities from the parties involved 
and hence, from a global cumulative perspective, create a tax loss for countries (OECD, 
2012:11). Tax differentials between countries contribute to this cumulative tax loss as debt 
funding is often utilised in a high-tax country where interest deductions can be claimed while 
the corresponding income is either taxed at a low rate or not taxed at all (OECD, 2013a:43).  
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Currently, there is no data on the extent of the tax losses suffered as a result of hybrid 
arrangements (which includes various structures like hybrid entities and hybrid instruments). 
These arrangements are, nonetheless, considered to reduce overall global taxes by a 
considerable amount (OECD, 2012:5). Similarly, the magnitude on the use of hybrid 
arrangements cannot easily be quantified, which Johannesen attributes to the inability to infer 
quantification from financial statements or standard business surveys. Based on qualitative 
evidence, hybrid arrangements are considered to be widely used and considered to be a 
contributing factor to declining effective tax rates on cross-border investment (Johannesen, 
2014: 40). 
 
A direct critique of the global tax loss suffered as a result of these arrangements is that there 
is no such concept as a common or collective tax base amongst countries. Each country has 
its own individual and separate tax base and is free to make its own decisions on what and 
how to tax. It is inevitable that the different rules applied by countries will result in 
inconsistent tax treatments, however, this is a deliberate inconsistency and hence companies 
cannot be said to be ‗exploiting‘ these inconsistencies (Macfarlanes, 2014:1). A possible 
response to this critique is that international tax principles are largely based on one 
jurisdiction forgoing tax revenues on the presumption that another jurisdiction would be 
imposing tax. Due to current tax arbitrage, these principles no longer hold true (OECD, 
2013a:47). Despite being compliant with the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, hybrid 
arrangements achieve a result that may not have been intended by the jurisdictions (OECD, 
2012:12). In addition, the OECD notes other concerns about such arrangements. These 
concerns include additional tax revenue being lost due to parties claiming deductions for 
costs on creating and implementing the hybrid instruments; multinational companies being 
placed at a competitive advantage earning higher (after-tax) profits compared to other smaller 
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enterprises; creating preferences for offshore investments or vice versa thus impacting on 
capital import and export neutrality; contributing to financial instability through, for instance, 
increased leverage and risk; and unfairness towards types of business that are not able to 
utilise such arrangements (OECD, 2012:11-12). Hence the concerns are much wider than the 
cumulative global tax effect.  
 
Despite the differences in opinions on whether the concerns related to cross-border hybrid 
arrangements are valid or not, these arrangements are widely considered to be one of the 
mechanisms used to erode the tax base in affected countries and shift profits from high to 
low-tax countries. These arrangements have been recognised by the authors of several 
research papers as an important tax planning tool. This is especially true when layered and 
complex group structures are created by multinational groups to aid in tax planning 
techniques. 
 
Practical examples of cross-border hybrid debt instruments 
 
Hybrid debt instruments can essentially be created using any combination of debt and equity 
characteristics. Theoretically, a myriad of different hybrid debt instruments can exist with 
vastly different terms and conditions. These instruments can be classified either as debt or as 
equity and inconsistencies in the classification of such instruments by different countries can 
create tax planning opportunities. A few of the hybrid debt instruments that have been used in 
practice are briefly described below. 
 
US perpetual loan  
Under the US tax regime, a perpetual loan is likely to be seen as equity. The US funder of 
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such a loan will thus treat the returns as dividend income and will be entitled to a foreign tax 
credit (Krahmal, 2005:109). If the recipient is located in a jurisdiction like France where the 
perpetual loan is treated as debt, the returns will qualify for deduction. Thus a US parent with 
a French subsidiary can reduce their combined tax burden through the use of a perpetual loan 
that achieves a French tax deduction with a favourable tax inclusion in the US (Johannesen, 
2012:3).  
 
Canadian preference shares  
Mandatory redeemable preference shares are seen as equity in Canada for tax purposes and 
returns are treated as dividends, which may not be included in income for tax purposes where 
these dividends are paid from the exempt surplus of an affiliate company. In Luxembourg, 
however, these shares are considered to be debt and a deduction is allowed for returns on the 
shares. The arrangement between two affiliated companies thus achieves a tax deduction in 
Luxembourg with no tax inclusion in Canada. The same result can be achieved by using the 
US instead of Luxembourg and by using preference shares that are subject to a repurchase 
agreement (KPMG, 2014a:3). 
 
Dutch participating loans  
Profit participating loans are treated as equity under certain circumstances in the Netherlands 
and the returns are recognised as dividends, which may qualify for a profit participation 
exemption and hence not be subject to any tax in the Netherlands. Under previous South 
African rules (i.e. prior to sections 8F and 8FA being introduced), the profit participating loan 
could have been viewed as debt, in which case the returns would have qualified for a tax 
deduction (de Koker & Brincker, 2010:8.2.2-8.2.3). Thus a favourable tax result could have 
been achieved by a multinational group with companies in these two jurisdictions.     
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Conclusion 
 
Due to the difference in the tax treatment of debt compared to equity and, specifically, the 
potential for returns on debt to be deductible whereas returns on equity are distributed out of 
after-tax profits, there is a bias towards debt funding in a corporate context. Multinational 
groups are able to further reduce the net tax suffered on funding arrangements through the 
utilisation of hybrid debt instruments and multi-tier group structures with entities are located 
in favourable tax jurisdictions. In this manner, a deduction for debt returns in the hands of 
one party with no corresponding taxable income in the hands of the other party is achieved. 
From a global perspective, tax jurisdictions lose out on tax revenues, and hence the global 
concern for such arrangements and the question faced by tax authorities on how to best 
address this concern. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – Global policy recommendations on addressing the bias 
towards debt funding 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the reasons that hybrid debt instruments are being utilised as a tax planning technique 
is due to the tax distinction between debt and equity and the different tax implications that 
arise on the two forms of funding. This chapter contains comments and recommendations 
made on tax policy changes that may assist in reducing or eliminating the preference for debt 
funding, either through eliminating the distinction between the two forms of funding or 
through introducing special tax rules.  
 
The need for a debt/equity distinction 
 
In 1958, Professors Modigliani and Miller demonstrated in their famous ―Proposition I‖ that, 
in the absence of taxes, corporations would be indifferent between debt and equity financing 
as no value could be created by changes in a corporation's capital structure (Madison, 
1986:468). According to Madison, the debt/equity distinction was one of the most frequently 
litigated issues in American tax law (1986:465). The issues surrounding this distinction have 
only grown over the years. It is now the subject of dynamic discussion within the tax 
fraternity. The foundation of this distinction and rationality behind the issues are being 
challenged. The vast differences between the tax rules applied by countries and the 
complexities of these rules are also being widely criticised (Schön et al, 2014:147). 
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Furthermore, the distinction is considered to have a detrimental influence on financing 
decisions (Schön et al, 2014:182).  
 
A number of proposals have been made to eliminate this distinction altogether (Krahmal, 
2005:106). For instance, De Mooij has concluded that, after taking legal, administrative and 
economic factors into account, there is little reason for the tax discrimination between debt 
and equity (2012:509). The legal criteria that are considered in the classification of debt and 
equity play a limited tax role and hence should not influence tax outcomes (Schön et al, 
2009:87-88). It has been argued that income, as an economic value, does not need to be 
distinguished based on how it was earned i.e. from debt or from equity. This is in line with 
the Schanz-Haig-Simons tax system which is based on the net increase in wealth (explained 
in more detail further below) (Schön et al, 2014:163). Furthermore, in applying current tax 
rules in a purely domestic setting, the classification of an instrument as debt or as equity 
should not matter as the return on the instrument would be taxed at least once. According to 
Schön et al, ―it makes sense to simply leave it to the financiers to opt for debt treatment or 
equity treatment. At least from the point of view of domestic tax law there is no logically 
superior solution‖. It could even be argued that the taxation principles governing equity 
instruments represent an irregularity in the tax system where it involves a double layer of 
taxation. This implies that the tax treatment relating to debt is the more ‗legitimate‘ or 
‗compliant‘ approach where tax laws are concerned (Schön et al, 2009:89-90).  
 
The general concern with respect to eliminating the debt/equity distinction altogether is that 
there are a number of other distortions within the tax system which would impact the overall 
efficiency of such a change (Krahmal, 2005:106). Nonetheless, policy options which would 
result in debt and equity being treated in the same way for tax purposes have been suggested. 
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While the debate on such policies continues, various other proposals have been made that 
may aid in resolving the debt/equity conundrum, as discussed below.  
 
Proposed policy options and special tax rules  
 
The policy options and special tax rules that have been proposed range from the commonly 
applied interest deductibility rules to the more radical options of reducing corporate tax rates 
in order to decrease the tax benefit derived from debt funding or changing the design of the 
tax system altogether (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 2012:11-12). Some of these are 
discussed in further detail below. 
 
Thin capitalisation and other interest deductibility rules 
 
Since the core of the problem appears to be the preference for debt funding as opposed to 
equity funding, one option would be to introduce a limit on the amount of debt funding that a 
company can have (commonly known as thin capitalisation rules). These rules essentially 
limit the deductibility of interest where the company is found to be excessively funded by 
debt. In addition, the denied interest can be recharacterised as dividends. Research papers 
indicate that thin capitalisation has been effective in reducing debt funding, and accordingly 
the level of the associated interest deduction (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 2012:11). 
The interest limitations can be based on ratios or a given constraint like a percentage of 
EBITDA (a financial term which means earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and 
amortisation) (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 2012:11). These rules are also referred to as 
income stripping rules. They can assist both with excessive debt funding and excessive 
interest rates attached to that debt funding.  
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De Mooij has pointed out that the number of countries introducing these types of rules has 
grown tremendously over the years. However, in addition to reducing the proportion of debt 
funding by companies, the rules have also reduced investment. The rules also add to the 
complexity of tax laws. De Mooij considers such rules to be imperfect solutions to the 
problem, which create their own distortions (2012:502,509). Furthermore, the rules are 
directed towards protecting the tax base of the country of the recipient of the funds and not in 
resolving the debt/equity differentiation issue itself. They also create double taxation through 
the denial of deductions (where the corresponding income will remain fully taxable) (Schön 
et al, 2014:206). 
 
Dividend relief techniques 
 
Dividend relied techniques eliminate the economic double taxation arising on equity returns, 
by recognising that tax has already been levied on these returns through the taxation of the 
profits of a company. The return / dividend is thus either fully exempt from tax in the hands 
of the shareholder or is taxed at a reduced rate. Alternatively, an imputation of the taxes 
already charged in the hands of the company declaring the dividend can be allowed in 
determining the tax arising on the dividend income for the recipient (Schön et al, 2014:183). 
However, based on the points made in the Max Planck Institute report, it must be noted that 
this approach essentially views the parties as a single unit i.e. it looks at the combined tax 
effect of the parties. It does not achieve tax neutrality between interest and dividends from the 
perspective of the individual parties (Schön et al, 2014:199). It therefore assists in reducing 
the debt bias but not in addressing the root of the problem, which is the differentiation itself.  
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Withholding taxes 
 
The international tax principle on the assignment of taxing rights between the home country 
(country of residence) and host country (source country) is regarded by some to be at the core 
of the base erosion and profit shifting issue on debt funding (Schön et al, 2014:203). As 
previously explained, in cross-border funding returns on debt are generally taxed in the 
country where the lender is tax resident (home country), whereas returns on equity are mainly 
taxed in the country where the borrower is tax resident (host country). This assignment 
creates an incentive to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions (by claiming 
deductions on interest in the high-tax country, and routing corresponding income to a low-tax 
jurisdiction where it is either not taxed at all or taxed at a low rate). Applying a withholding 
tax to the interest leaving the host country can reallocate the taxing rights to that host country. 
However, this only serves as a solution when the recipient is in a low-tax country (Schön et 
al, 2014:203). It could otherwise create issues of its own, like excessive tax being levied on 
the same income without adequate double-taxation relief being available.  
 
While withholding taxes are levied on different income streams and can be levied on both 
interest and dividends, it is the rate of this withholding tax that is at the discretion of each 
country and can be used to adjust the tax revenue earned by that (host) country. For instance, 
a higher rate can be levied on interest while a lower rate is applied to dividends, as the 
underlying profits out of which dividends are declared would already have been subject to tax 
in the host country (Schön et al, 2014:204). Nevertheless, levying a withholding tax on both 
dividends and interest income once again means that returns on equity are subjected to a 
higher tax burden than returns on debt as a result of the combination of a non-tax deduction 
for returns on equity together with a withholding tax (Schön et al, 2014:211).  
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Similar to the interest deductibility rules, withholding taxes protect the tax base of the host 
country and do not resolve the debt/equity differentiation issue (Schön et al, 2014:206). High 
withholding tax rates also reduce a country‘s attractiveness as an investment location (Schön 
et al, 2014:211). In practice, withholding taxes are more prominent in developing countries 
than in developed, however the reasons for this are not necessary driven by the debt/equity 
issue (Schön et al, 2014:204). 
 
Anti-avoidance rules 
 
The OECD considers general anti-avoidance rules an effective tool in addressing certain tax 
avoidance arrangements, like those with artificial features. The rules are considered difficult 
to apply as a direct link often needs to be established between the transaction and tax 
avoidance. Amongst the recommendations are specific anti-avoidance rules in the host 
country that deny a deduction where the corresponding income is not subject to a minimum 
level of taxation in the home country, or that deny a deduction where the main purpose of the 
transaction is to obtain a tax advantage (OECD, 2012:13-14 and Johannesen, 2014:41). 
Johannesen notes that, despite being considered a suitable solution, these rules exist in a 
limited number of countries (2014:46). This may be due to the difficulty experienced in 
applying such rules due to their reference to foreign tax law treatment, as pointed out by the 
OECD (2012:14). According to Johannesen, in order to be effective these rules need to treat 
conduit entities as transparent and look through the chain of conduits in order to ascertain the 
final or net outcome of the finance structure. Anti-abuse rules can be developed that enable 
the tax authorities to treat transactions between multiple related parties as a transaction 
between two entities only, thereby eliminating the flow-through transactions (Johannesen, 
2014:45). He also indicates that controlled foreign company rules are one mechanism of 
54 
 
addressing conduit structures (2014:45). However, these rules all add to the complexity of tax 
laws and the application thereof. 
 
Uniform tax treatment for debt and equity 
 
Eliminating the debt/equity distinction for tax purposes, by treating debt and equity in a 
similar way, is considered to be one of the more radical policy options. There are various 
suggestions on the design of tax systems that achieve this. Two alternate designs are 
discussed below, the one being an allowance for corporate equity (‗ACE‘) and the other 
being a comprehensive business income tax (‗CBIT‘). Under the first system, a deduction is 
granted for returns on equity. Hence dividends would be treated in the same manner as 
interest. The second system denies the deduction of interest. Interest is thereby treated in the 
same manner as dividends. Both systems achieve a uniform treatment for debt and equity 
returns (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 2012:12).  
 
The ACE system taxes investments in a similar manner as a cash-flow tax and thus has the 
advantage of creating neutrality between funding options (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 
2012:13). In addition, it removes the economic double taxation that arises on corporate 
profits whereby the income is subject to tax in both the hands of the company and in the 
hands of the shareholder on distribution as a dividend (Schön et al, 2014:180). While detailed 
mechanics of the ACE systems is outside the scope of this report, it may be valuable to note 
that the system does provide for additional deductions which reduce the tax base and, 
consequently, tax revenues for countries. Countries may therefore have to increase their tax 
rates in order to compensate or establish their own solution to the loss in tax revenues. Being 
the direct opposite of ACE, the benefit of the CBIT system is that it increases tax revenues 
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for authorities and, in so doing, facilitates a reduction in the tax rate. Since corporate 
investment, choices on the location of companies and profit-shifting are presumed to be 
partially linked to corporate tax rates, reducing tax rates should have a favourable effect for 
countries. This is, however, a simplistic conclusion and many other factors need to be taken 
into account. The potential negative effect on companies also needs to be factored into the 
analysis (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 2012:12-13).  
 
According to De Mooij, while both systems eliminate the tax discrimination between debt 
and equity, the economic properties and implications of these two systems is distinctly 
different. He pointed out that the CBIT is more in line with the Schanz-Haig-Simons tax 
system (which is explained below) (2012:501). De Mooij has undertaken a detailed analysis 
of these two systems and has also noted countries that have introduced variants of such 
systems. For instance, Belgium, Brazil, Latvia and Italy allow a notional deduction on certain 
equity (De Mooij, 2012:506). The Dutch tax authorities were also considering providing a 
fixed deduction to Dutch companies on their profits (van Gelder, 2013:147). This equity 
allowance does come at a cost i.e. the loss in tax revenues (De Mooij, 2012:506). Another 
option is to develop a system that combines aspects of the ACE and CBIT systems, focusing 
on the advantages of the two systems and avoiding the disadvantages of both systems. 
Despite the considerable benefits that can be obtained by doing this, very few countries have 
actually implemented such a system (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 2012:15-16). 
According to Schön et al, deviations from a uniform tax system that have developed over 
time within domestic and international tax systems has resulted in the need for a distinction 
between debt and equity. Hence, while it may appear reasonable to eliminate the debt/equity 
distinction for tax purposes through such systems, it is very difficult to do so in practice 
(Schön et al, 2014:216).  
56 
 
Schanz-Haig-Simons tax system  
 
The purpose of the Schanz-Haig-Simons system is to achieve a uniform and synthetic tax 
system. Under this system, it is the net increase in wealth and a comprehensive concept of 
income that is the focal point. Hence it is the actual increase in wealth that matters and not 
the specific income stream that gives rise to it i.e. whether it is through interest income or a 
profit share/dividend. The difference between interest and a profit share only matters when 
considering the risk profile and volatility of the income stream, although this impacts its 
quantity and not its quality as income. This line of thinking can be compared to the approach 
where capital gains are not differentiated based on the type of asset that was sold. In other 
words, the tax rules remain the same irrespective of whether the asset was classified as a debt 
instrument or an equity instrument. A tax system of this nature is based from the outset on 
financial neutrality.  
 
There are various ways of implementing such a tax system. A detailed discussion on these 
various option falls outside the scope of this report. In brief, a cash-flow method combined 
with a consumption-style income tax is one option. This results in income that is reinvested in 
order to generate additional income not being taxed while income that is utilised for private 
consumption is subject to tax. This treatment is applied consistently irrespective of the type 
of income i.e. whether it arises from debt or from equity (Schön et al, 2014:163-164). 
―Income‖ for this purpose is based on the traditional understanding of the term, which looks 
at unconstrained access thereto. Hence a person must have the ability to determine the use of 
an amount before it can be attributed to that person as their income. This ability is linked to 
actual decision-making powers rather than mere formalities (Schön et al, 2014:199-200). Up 
until the date of the release of the report by the Max Planck Institute, no country had 
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implemented a comprehensive consumption tax or a system similar to the principles of the 
Schanz-Haig-Simons tax system (Schön et al, 2014:179). It thus remains a theoretical option 
on eliminating the debt/equity distinction and completely changing the manner in which taxes 
are levied.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Of the various policy options and specific tax rules that have been recommended, the most 
radical but arguably most effective solution would be to entirely eliminate the debt/equity 
distinction for tax purposes and tax the two forms of funding in exactly the same manner. 
This will eliminate both the challenges faced in classifying instruments as debt or as equity 
instruments and the preference for debt funding. In practice, this policy change is unlikely to 
happen. Certain jurisdictions have, nonetheless, introduced specific rules that try and reduce 
the tax differential between debt and equity funding. The use of a notional deduction for 
equity returns is one example of such a rule. The more ‗acceptable‘ approach, however, 
appears to be the introduction of special rules that deter the use of debt funding, like interest 
limitation rules or interest withholding taxes. These options do not assist with the 
classification challenge, however, they do assist in reducing the debt bias. Nonetheless, they 
still remain imperfect solutions which could create issues or distortions of their own.  
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CHAPTER SIX – Global policy recommendations on the use of hybrid 
debt funding 
 
Introduction 
 
The policy options and special tax rules discussed in the previous chapter relate more to 
eliminating the bias towards debt funding and eliminating the debt/equity distinction itself. 
An additional option is to introduce special rules that specifically address hybrid debt 
instruments, which are instruments that cannot clearly be classified as debt or as equity and 
could hence be viewed differently by different jurisdictions. By addressing hybrid debt 
instruments directly, there may not be a need to eliminate the bias towards debt funding or 
the distinction between debt and equity funding. The main recommendations on hybrid debt 
instrument rules have been made by the OECD. These recommendations are discussed below. 
 
The OECD‟s project on hybrid funding 
 
Per the OECD, globalisation has benefitted many economies and supported the development 
of many countries. Globalisation does, however, impact the tax systems of countries and can 
lead to negative effects on the tax revenues of countries. This creates a need for an adequate 
set of international tax rules and a coherent approach by countries. While each country has a 
sovereign right to design their own tax policy, the collaboration of countries is required in 
order to design policies that counteract the negative effects of globalisation and address the 
gaps and overlaps created by differences in the tax policies of countries. The idea behind 
complementary and coherent rules would be to prevent both double taxation and double non-
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taxation (OECD, 2013b:7-9,15). This is supported by various researchers like Schön et al and 
Johannesen who have noted nationally and internationally uniform criteria as an especially 
important goal and have reiterated the need for an internationally co-ordinated approach 
(Schön et al, 2014:217 and Johannesen, 2014:41). The OECD has made recommendations for 
rules on hybrid instruments, which comprise of model treaty provisions for double taxation 
agreements and domestic law provisions. This research report only covers domestic law 
recommendations.  
 
Based on input by numerous countries around the world, including both developed and 
developing countries as well as OECD member countries and non-member countries; 
consultations with other stakeholders like business representatives, trade unions, civil society 
organisations and academics; and feedback from the general public; the OECD released a 
detailed report on hybrid instruments during the latter part of 2014 and then issued a 
comprehensive final version of this report in October 2015 (OECD, 2014a:3 and OECD, 
2015:3). The report was titled ―Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements‖ 
(‗OECD‘s hybrid report‘) and was issued in response to action 2 of the OECD‘s ―Action Plan 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting‖. The OECD‘s hybrid report covered various forms of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements. Only the recommendations on hybrid debt instruments are 
discussed below.  
 
Scope and purpose of the OECD recommendations 
 
The recommendations in the OECD‘s hybrid report are aimed at tax mismatches. For OECD 
purposes, a tax mismatch occurs where there is a difference in the tax treatment of an 
arrangement under the laws of two or more tax jurisdictions, thereby achieving double non-
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taxation (which also includes long-term deferral of taxes) (OECD, 2015:11). For hybrid debt 
instruments, this occurs where payments under that instrument are characterised differently 
by different tax jurisdictions, thereby resulting in mutually incompatible tax treatments of 
that same payment by the tax jurisdictions involved (OECD, 2012:7 and OECD, 2014a:29-
31). A typical example is a payment qualifying for a deduction in one jurisdiction (like 
interest paid) which is not taxable in the other jurisdiction (like exempt dividends). Tax 
differences arising as a result of the valuation of money, like foreign currency fluctuations, 
are not considered a mismatch (OECD, 2015:18).  
 
The OECD‘s hybrid report targets only tax mismatches that utilise a hybrid element to 
achieve such a mismatch. However, the OECD acknowledges that it is impossible to identify 
and define all such mismatches due to the wide variety of financial instruments used in 
practice and the different ways that they are taxed by countries. The focus of the OECD‘s 
hybrid report is therefore on aligning the treatment of payments under financial instruments 
with the treatment in the counterparty jurisdiction, thus eliminating the mismatch but without 
impacting the commercial outcomes (OECD, 2015:11,18).  
 
The OECD has listed some of the objectives of their recommendations in the report. These 
objectives include neutralising the mismatch rather than reversing the tax benefit that arises 
under the laws of the jurisdiction; avoiding double taxation through rule co-ordination 
between countries; minimising disruption to existing domestic law and providing sufficient 
flexibility for rules to be incorporated into the laws of each jurisdiction; and minimising 
administrative burdens and compliance costs for taxpayers and tax authorities. The 
recommended measures require co-operation and co-ordination between jurisdictions, an 
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approach that is needed to order to adequately and efficiently address hybrid mismatches and 
other base erosion and profit shifting techniques (OECD, 2015:93-94).  
 
OECD recommendations  
 
The recommendations are organised in a hierarchy, with a primary rule and a secondary or 
defensive rule. This hierarchy is in order to prevent double taxation from occurring through 
application of the rules. Double taxation could arise where, for instance, more than one 
jurisdiction applies the hybrid debt rules to the same hybrid debt instrument (OECD, 
2015:11-12). Hence a jurisdiction need not apply the hybrid debt rules where the counterparty 
jurisdiction is already applying a hybrid debt rule that neutralises the tax mismatch (OECD, 
2015:18). The rules therefore link the domestic tax treatment by a jurisdiction to the foreign 
tax treatment in the counterparty jurisdiction.  
 
The primary and secondary rules relating to hybrid debt instruments are explained under 
chapters 1, 2 and 8 of the OECD‘s hybrid report. The domestic law design principles are 
contained in chapter 9 (which includes the objectives discussed above as well as 
implementation challenges). Certain terms are defined in chapters 10, 11 and 12 of the 
OECD‘s hybrid report. Some of the points discussed in the chapters are summarised below. A 
detailed discussion on definitions is excluded. 
 
Hybrid financial instrument recommendation 
 
Recommendation 1 in chapter 1 of the OECD‘s hybrid report is the main recommendation 
with respect to financial instruments. As a first measure, the OECD recommends adjusting 
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tax deductions in the payer jurisdiction. Payments under a hybrid financial instrument that 
result in a hybrid mismatch should be denied as a deduction in the payer jurisdiction to the 
extent that it is not included in the ordinary income of the payee within a reasonable period of 
time (OECD, 2015:23,25). As a second measure, where the payer jurisdiction does not 
neutralise a mismatch that arises, the payee jurisdiction should include the payment in 
ordinary income (OECD, 2015:23). The combined adjustments under the primary and 
secondary rules should not, however, result in double taxation (OECD, 2015:32).  
 
The OECD has not defined the term ―hybrid financial instrument‖. The OECD states that this 
is due to the wide variety of financial instruments and the various ways in which they can be 
classified and treated for tax purposes, which make it impossible to capture all situations 
where a hybrid mismatch may arise. The OECD has therefore left it to each jurisdiction to 
define a ―hybrid financial instrument‖ but has provided recommendations on the definition of 
a ―financial instrument‖ (OECD, 2015:25). The term ―payment‖ is defined and may include 
future or contingent obligations to make payment. In considering deductions, equivalent tax 
relief like tax credits are to be taken into account (OECD, 2015:27). Any exemptions, 
exclusions, tax credits or similar that is available in the payee jurisdiction must also be taken 
into account when determining whether the amount is included in ordinary income. The rules 
are, however, based on expected tax outcomes in the counterparty jurisdiction hence the 
actual tax treatment need not be determined by the taxpayer or tax authorities (OECD, 
2015:28). It must be noted that the rules do not require reclassification of the payment for tax 
purposes. For instance, if it is treated as interest in the payer jurisdiction, it remains interest 
and need not be reclassified as a dividend (OECD, 2015:32). It is merely the mismatch that is 
eliminated.  
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Complexities in applying the rules may arise in practice. For instance, the OECD‘s hybrid 
report indicates that where the counterparty is transparent (for tax purposes) or has a taxable 
presence in more than one jurisdiction, the laws of multiple jurisdictions may need to be 
considered order to determine whether a mismatch arises and apply the rules (OECD, 
2015:41). Furthermore, where the payment is taken into account in multiple jurisdictions or 
in jurisdictions other than the payer and payee jurisdictions, the treatment in all jurisdictions 
would essentially need to be taken into consideration. A deduction in any jurisdiction is 
sufficient to trigger the rule, while an adequate inclusion in income in any jurisdiction is 
sufficient to discharge application of the rules (OECD, 2015:41). Other factors like foreign 
branch rules, territorial regimes (where all foreign source income is exempt), no-tax 
jurisdictions, exempt or reduced-rate entities and similar also need to be taken into account as 
they would not trigger a mismatch (OECD, 2015:30-31,43). In addition, the rules have a 
defined scope as well as a list of exceptions (OECD, 2015:24). Arrangements like hybrid 
transfers, where jurisdictions take inconsistent views on who the owner of the return is, or 
substitute payments, which are payments made for financial or equity return, are included in 
the scope (OECD, 2015:26). These may add to complexities as they require further analysis 
and understanding of arrangements by tax authorities.  
 
Financial instrument recommendation 
 
Recommendation 2 in chapter 2 of the OECD‘s hybrid report is a recommended 
improvement to domestic law. It is a specific rule that operates in addition to the primary and 
secondary rules above (OECD, 2015:16). In terms of this rule, dividend exemptions and other 
dividend relief techniques provided as relief against double taxation on corporate profits 
should be denied to the extent that the dividend payment is deductible in the payer 
64 
 
jurisdiction. Such relief should ideally only be available for dividends declared out of taxed 
profits. Similarly, tax credits or relief for foreign tax withheld on payments under a hybrid 
transfer should be restricted to the net taxable income of the taxpayer under the arrangement. 
Hybrid transfers often result in economic benefits being shared between jurisdictions and 
hence the tax credits should be proportionate (OECD, 2015:45-47). 
 
OECD imported mismatch recommendation 
 
Recommendation 8 in chapter 8 of the OECD‘s hybrid report deals with imported 
mismatches, which would not otherwise be captured under recommendations 1 or 2 above. It 
involves a first payment that is deductible in the payer jurisdiction and which gives rise to 
ordinary income in the payee jurisdiction, and a second deductible payment (hybrid 
mismatch) which is set-off against that income. The income can therefore be viewed as 
‗funding‘ the hybrid deduction or as being ‗sheltered‘ by the imported mismatch arrangement 
(OECD, 2015:86). Under this rule, the payer jurisdiction should deny a deduction for a 
payment to the extent that the payee directly or indirectly utilises the corresponding income 
of that payment in set-off against a payment made by the payee under a financial instrument 
which gives rise to a hybrid mismatch (OECD, 2015:83). These imported mismatches 
essentially arise through the use of more than one financial instrument or arrangement and 
through payments that are made in different financial years. It could also involve third 
jurisdictions or multi-tier structures and multiple parties. The different steps within an 
arrangement and the different parties involved will have to be investigated. The rule thus 
requires co-ordination between jurisdictions and can be complex to apply (OECD, 2015:83-
84,86-87). According to the OECD, the problem of imported mismatches only exists due to a 
lack of effective hybrid mismatch rules. Hence if all jurisdictions introduce the rules 
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recommended by the OECD, the effect of hybrid mismatches will be neutralised in the 
jurisdiction where it arises and the importation of mismatches into other jurisdictions will be 
prevented. The rule on imported mismatches will thereby become an additional safety 
mechanism (OECD, 2015:85).  
 
Implementation challenges relating to the OECD recommendations 
 
Amongst the different challenges that may arise in introducing special hybrid mismatch rules, 
complexity and co-ordination appear to be the main ones. As mentioned above, some of the 
rules are complex and hence further guidance on them may be required. Each jurisdiction 
would also have to take into account its existing legislative and tax policy framework and 
ensure effective integration and application of the rules within this framework (OECD, 
2015:94,96). While the recommendations above are on changes to be made to domestic 
legislation and the rules should apply on a stand-alone basis in each jurisdiction (i.e. 
irrespective of whether the counterparty jurisdiction has hybrid mismatch rules), the linking 
of the domestic rules to foreign rules makes co-ordination and co-operation between 
jurisdictions important (OECD, 2015:18,95). Without consistent application by jurisdictions, 
taxpayers may suffer negative consequences like double taxation (OECD, 2015:94). The 
OECD indicates that the use of the hierarchy of the rules should prevent double taxation and 
avoid the need for a tie-breaker clause (OECD, 2015:96). However, consistent application is 
still essential for this to hold true and, should a counterparty jurisdiction apply its own set of 
hybrid mismatch rules, double taxation may still occur. The OECD‘s hybrid report has not 
specifically addressed such instances under its domestic law recommendations on hybrid 
financial instruments, but has rather emphasised the importance of a co-ordinated approach 
by all jurisdictions in addressing the global concern for hybrid mismatches (as opposed to 
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unilateral measures by each jurisdiction) (OECD, 2015:99,102). A co-ordinated approach not 
only prevents double taxation but will assist in reducing compliance costs for both taxpayers 
and tax authorities (OECD, 2015:99).  
 
The OECD‘s hybrid report notes additional measures like the development of agreed 
guidance on the recommendations; review of implementation by jurisdictions; information 
exchange between jurisdictions; making information available to taxpayers; and considering 
the interaction with the recommendations by the OECD under other ‗actions‘ of the OECD‘s 
―Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan‖ (OECD, 2015:93). An important point for 
jurisdictions to note is that the objective of the OECD‘s hybrid report is to neutralise hybrid 
mismatches and not to establish whether the tax base of a jurisdiction has been eroded and to 
recoup that lost tax revenue (OECD, 2015:95). The combined recommendations act as a 
comprehensive and coherent package to achieve this objective and selective application may 
result in tax planning opportunities as well as undue compliance burdens on taxpayers 
(OECD, 2015:94-95). The combined rules should also reduce the distinction between debt 
and equity funding in cross-border transactions (OECD, 2015:99).  
  
In order to assist with understanding the recommended rules, the OECD has included in its 
hybrid report 37 examples on the hybrid financial instrument recommendation, 3 examples 
on the financial instrument recommendation, 16 examples on the imported mismatch 
recommendation and a few other examples on design principles and definitions (OECD, 
2015:171-174). While the recommendations have merit, the introduction of new rules by 
countries is a time-intensive exercise. In addition, the recommendations amount to 
considerable changes in tax policy for many countries and it may prove to be a challenge for 
countries to draft such rules (KPMGa, 2014:6). According to Deloitte, the examples in the 
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OECD report indicate that the rules ―necessarily will be complex‖ (2015:1). EY has also 
commented on the complexity of the recommendations in the OECD report. EY has further 
stated that, due to the complexities and difficulties that countries may face in implementing 
the OECD recommendations, it is unclear as to what extent countries will adopt the 
recommended rules (2015:10-11). Although some countries have started introducing their 
own rules on hybrid instruments, it remains to be seen how many countries globally 
implement the OECD recommendations. Despite the introduction of hybrid debt rules in tax 
jurisdictions and the recommendations made by the OECD, there remains criticism on taking 
such an approach. One of the questions raised relates to why a particular jurisdiction should 
deny a deduction that qualifies for deduction in all respects, including meeting transfer 
pricing requirements and not falling within anti-avoidance rules, purely based on it being paid 
to a recipient in a jurisdiction that takes a different tax view (Macfarlanes, 2014:2).  It is a 
valid question that appears to have remained unanswered. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The OECD recommendations involve linking the domestic tax rules on hybrid debt 
instruments to the foreign tax treatment. Essentially, the deduction for a payment (e.g. 
interest) should only be granted by the domestic tax jurisdiction to the extent that the 
corresponding income is subject to tax in the foreign tax jurisdiction. Alternatively, no 
exemption should be granted on the income if it was deductible in the counterparty 
jurisdiction. Similarly with dividend exemptions or other dividend relief mechanisms, these 
should only be granted where the corresponding payment was not deductible in the 
counterparty jurisdiction. The linking of domestic tax rules to foreign tax rules can be 
complex and difficult to apply in practice. The level of co-ordination between jurisdictions 
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that is required to effectively apply the rules may prove to be too challenging and onerous for 
many jurisdictions. Nonetheless, introducing special rules for hybrid debt instruments may 
reduce the debt/equity classification concerns associated with such instruments as the 
domestic tax implications are linked to foreign tax rules (as opposed to being entirely based 
on the tax classification of such instruments). It may also reduce the need for further debt 
funding related rules. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – Tax policies currently applied by other jurisdictions 
 
Introduction 
 
Based on the discussion in the previous chapters, there appears to be two tax issues where 
hybrid debt instruments are concerned; the first being its classification as debt or as equity, 
due to the difference in tax implications; and the second being its use as a tax planning tool, 
especially in cross-border funding arrangements. This, in turn, raises two policy questions; (i) 
whether a specific tax definition for debt and equity is required in order to categorise all 
instruments as either debt or equity, thereby eliminating the uncertainty on the tax 
classification of hybrid debt instruments; and (ii) whether specific rules are required for 
hybrid debt instruments, especially where cross-border tax planning is concerned, as tax 
concerns may not be addressed through specific tax definitions. Thus far, policy 
recommendations have not directly addressed the classification issue. This may be due to it 
not being possible to capture all types of hybrid debt instruments within a specific definition. 
Policy recommendations have thus centred more on reducing the debt/equity distinction and 
the preference for debt funding. The OECD has taken a further step and recommended 
special rules on the tax treatment of hybrid debt instruments. This chapter will provide an 
overview of the stance that other countries have taken and the policy options that can be 
found in practice.  
 
Debt/Equity tax classification trends 
 
According to Johannesen, tax laws need a set of rules in order to differentiate between debt 
and equity (2012:2). Traditionally, it was an instrument‘s legal form that dictated whether it 
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was classified as debt or equity for tax purposes. The analysis performed by the Max Planck 
Institute was also based on the legal systems of various countries. With the growth in 
concerns on hybrid instruments being used as a tax planning tool, there is an increasing focus 
on the debt/equity classification from a tax perspective and on deviations from the traditional 
legal form approach. 
 
Generally, a shift in the tax world has been taking place towards an evaluation of the 
substance or economic essence of a transaction rather than its legal form. This shift also 
impacts the tax classification of hybrid finance and, with this shift, the tax authorities of 
various countries have developed their own approaches in resolving the hybrid finance tax 
dilemma (Johannesen, 2012:2). Part of the analysis performed by the Max Planck Institute 
was on the consistency of the classification rules from a tax perspective compared to a legal 
perspective for the countries under review. The various countries that were reviewed differed 
in their domestic rules. Most of the countries did not lean towards reclassifying funding that 
was considered debt for corporate law purposes as equity for tax purposes. In addition, 
shareholders from a corporate law perspective were considered to be the investors of equity, 
notwithstanding any preferential or limiting contractual arrangements (be it on the returns, 
participation or rights). Hence tax classifications were still fairly aligned with legal 
classifications (Schön et al, 2014:187-190).  
 
The dependence of tax classification on legal classification is still being debated and many of 
the countries were introducing tax-specific rules at the time of the review by the Max Planck 
Institute. However, since there is significant variation between countries in the approach 
taken, the potential for the same instrument to be treated as debt in one country and equity in 
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another country continues to exist (Johannesen, 2012:2). A more detailed discussion on the 
tax classification approach taken by specific countries is included below.  
 
Australia 
 
The Australian Tax Office issued a guide with a list of criteria that are to be assessed in 
evaluating whether a financial instrument is classified as debt or equity. Prior to the guide 
being released, it was an instrument‘s legal form that largely dictated its tax treatment. An 
instrument meeting both the debt and equity tests per the guide is considered to be debt for 
tax purposes. The debt test comprises of five fundamental elements, namely, that a scheme 
must exist; the scheme must be a financing arrangement; a financial benefit must be derived; 
the obligation for the company to provide future financial benefits must not be contingent; 
and it must be substantially more likely than not that the cumulative financial benefits 
provided must be equal to or more than the cumulative financial benefits derived. The 
elements of the equity test are that a share must be issued; the returns on the share or interest 
must be dependent on the company‘s economic performance; returns must be at the 
discretion of the company; or the interest obtained by the party providing the funding must 
convert to a share or interest that contain the previous two elements (Brincker, 2011:B2.1 and 
The Treasury, 2015:9-10). Other aspects like profit elements within debt, participation in 
losses, the entitlement to fixed returns on a share and the repayment of capital are also 
reviewed (Schön et al, 2014:202).  
 
Australia is one of the many countries around the globe that places great emphasis on the 
economic substance of a transaction. The debt/equity guide takes that into account. Since the 
guide was issued a number of years ago, the growth in the number and complexities of hybrid 
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instruments has resulted in the Australian Government undertaking a project in 2013 to re-
evaluate the debt/equity distinction. As part of this project, tax rules applied by different 
countries, international developments and tax arbitrage involving Australia and other 
countries were reviewed (The Treasury, 2014:15,19,139). A discussion paper was released on 
the findings of this project in 2014 and a final report in 2015. Changes were to be made by 
the Australian tax authorities based on these findings. 
 
The Netherlands 
 
In the Netherlands, it is the civil law classification that usually dictates the tax treatment of 
debt and equity. However, it is not unknown for debt to be categorised as equity and an 
interest deduction denied for tax purposes. Situations have also arisen where the converse has 
taken place and equity was regarded as debt (Van Gelder, 2013:140). Based on Dutch case 
law, the repayment obligation within a financial instrument is an essential attribute of debt. 
Three exceptions to this rule have been noted in practice; namely, sham loans, loss financing 
loans and participating loans. Specifically for participating loans, it can be reclassified from 
debt to equity if certain criteria are met. These criteria are linked to the profit-dependence of 
returns, the ranking or subordination feature and a long or perpetual tenure period (Van 
Gelder, 2013:140 and (Schön et al, 2014:193). Where other financial instruments are 
concerned, limited consideration is given to the subordination feature (Schön et al, 
2014:195).  
 
Judgements have been made by the Dutch courts whereby the legal form of a transaction is 
reclassified for tax purposes in light of the economic result and the objective of the applicable 
tax provisions. Under the sham transaction doctrine, the facts of the court case at hand will be 
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taken into account and it must be shown that the actual intention of the parties differed from 
the apparent intention of the transaction (Van Gelder, 2013:144).  
 
Generally, the classification of a financial instrument in another jurisdiction does not 
influence the characterisation in the Netherlands for tax purposes, although the foreign 
treatment of a cross-border instrument may, in certain instances, be taken into account (Van 
Gelder, 2013:147). 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The approach adopted in the United Kingdom is that of following the legal nature of an 
instrument. The United Kingdom allows for a fair degree of flexibility in structuring equity 
funding arrangements and shares are rarely treated as debt for tax purposes. Similarly, debt 
with equity characteristics, like perpetual bonds, is still treated as debt (Schön et al, 
2009:86,90-91). However, special tax provisions do exist which restrict the deductibility of 
profit-dependent returns. In line with the substance over form approach, the economic 
substance of the return is evaluated as to whether it represents financial remuneration for the 
use of money for a certain period of time; how it compares with market-related rates; whether 
it is fixed; and the probability of returns not being produced. Other factors like options for 
deferral of payment are also taken into account, while features like subordination generally 
do not play a role (Schön et al, 2014:190-195).  
 
In the United Kingdom, hybrid rules have been introduced that take the foreign tax treatment 
into account. However, this relates more to the tax treatment of returns than the classification 
thereof, which is discussed further below.  
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United States 
 
The courts in the United States have, over the years, dealt with many legal cases on the 
debt/equity classification and guidance was provided by the tax authorities through some of 
these legal cases (Krahmal, 2005:104-105). A multi-factor test was developed to determine 
whether an instrument should be classified as debt or as equity (Schön et al, 2014:172). The 
list of factors include the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; the source of funds 
used to make payments; the right to enforce payments of returns and capital; participation 
rights; the risk attached to the funds extended, including whether the funds are secured; what 
the funds were used for; the subordination ranking of the financial instrument; the debt/equity 
structure of the company; the company‘s ability to obtain external funds; and the intention of 
the parties (Krahmal, 2005:105 and Lewis, 2013:1-2). Of these factors, a few are considered 
to be vital indicators of whether the instrument is debt or equity while others, like the 
subordination feature, play a lesser role in the evaluation. Legal enforceability or a right to 
sue strongly indicates a debt relationship, as do security and a fixed maturity date (Lewis, 
2013:1-2 and Schön et al, 2014:191). With respect to maturity dates, options to defer 
repayment dates are also considered important, particularly in situations where there is 
uncertainty as to the actual repayment. Profit-dependent returns that require a board 
resolution generally indicate the instrument is equity, but there can be exceptions to this rule 
(Schön et al, 2014:192,194).  
 
It must be noted that the guidance issued by the United Stated Internal Revenue Service does 
indicate that an instrument having both debt and equity characteristics should be classified as 
equity rather than debt (Brincker, 2011:B2.1). This indicates a preference for equity 
classification by the United States tax authorities. Thus, contractual holdings are easily 
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classified as equity and convertible loans can be classified as equity at the outset, for 
instance, where the economic risk of a loss in the value of an underlying share is borne by the 
investor (Schön et al, 2014:192,196). Like many other countries, the United States also 
places emphasis on the substance of a transaction rather than its form (Krahmal, 2005:106).  
 
Similar to the Netherlands, the classification of cross-border instruments is not dependent on 
foreign country treatment. It may, nonetheless, be examined where there is a loss to the 
domestic fiscus (Krahmal, 2005:108-114). 
 
Singapore 
 
The Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, in recognising that hybrid instruments exhibit 
both debt-like and equity-like features, issued a guide for taxpayers setting out the taxation 
thereof and the steps for determining classification as debt or equity. The first step noted in 
this guide is the examination of the legal rights and obligations created by the instrument and 
identification of potential ownership interests. Thereafter, instruments are evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis where the full facts and circumstances at hand, as well as a combination of 
various factors, are taken into account. Factors include the nature of the interest acquired and 
whether a shareholding and residual interest is obtained; participation rights; voting rights; 
the obligation to repay the principal amount of the funding irrespective of the financial 
position of the company; whether returns are contingent and cumulative; the investor‘s right 
to enforce payment; the classification by other regulatory authorities within Singapore; and 
the ranking for repayment on liquidation or dissolution. For cross-border instruments, the 
classification by the foreign country will also be considered and any mismatches evaluated. 
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The tax authorities do offer taxpayers the option of obtaining an advance ruling on the tax 
treatment of specific hybrid instruments (IRAS, 2014: 4-9).  
 
Other European countries 
 
In other countries like Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland, an arguably more 
favourable tax treatment is adopted. For French tax purposes, the legal form appears to 
dictate its tax treatment. Shares are considered to be equity and obligations as debt, usually 
regardless of whether the instruments contain any hybrid terms (Schön et al, 2009:25-26,85). 
Contractual holdings are generally treated as debt in France and the payments made thereon 
are deductible, with special treatment being applied in exceptional cases (Schön et al, 
2014:190). The Austrian classification for tax purposes largely depends on the financier‘s 
participation in the entity‘s profits, gains and goodwill. The risks involved and legal position 
of the financier is more relevant for corporate and accounting purposes rather than tax. An 
instrument can thus be classified differently for legal and tax purposes, with the tax 
classification appearing to follow a more ‗simplistic‘ approach (Schön et al, 2009:17-18). For 
Swiss tax purposes, instruments that are debt in form are treated as debt and Swiss accounting 
principles are followed. Debt is usually only reclassified in certain situations, like where the 
entity is considered to be thinly capitalised (i.e. having excessive debt compared to equity) in 
terms of Swiss tax rules. (KPMG, 2014b:10). Payments on contractual holdings are generally 
deductible with special treatment applying in exceptional situations (Schön et al, 2014:190). 
However, the substance of an instrument can be taken into account and can influence its 
classification (Schön et al, 2009:85). Under German tax law, a greater emphasis is placed on 
the economic substance rather than the legal form. The means by which the financier is 
compensated plays a decisive role (Schön et al, 2009:42). In all countries, convertible bonds 
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are initially treated as debt and subsequently treated as equity (after conversion), with varying 
rules applying to the interest fluctuations. Subordination is usually not a consideration at all. 
While profit participation is a consideration in all countries, a greater significance is placed 
on this by the German and Austrian tax authorities. Profit-participating bonds or loans are 
generally treated as debt. However, if the participation rights include a right to participate in 
the proceeds on liquidation, then the instrument can be treated as equity. German tax law also 
contains special provisions where the participation of losses is concerned. In both France and 
Germany, perpetual bonds are considered to be debt. Where an instrument contains deferral 
options, the implication depends on whether the requirement to pay falls away entirely or 
whether it is merely deferred to a later point in time (Schön et al, 2014:195,202 and Schön et 
al, 2009:25-26,91). Instruments can thus easily be classified as debt for tax purposes in the 
above countries. The authorities in Germany are, however, considered to be more closely 
connected with economic content of an arrangement.  
 
It is clear from the above sample countries that variations between countries in the tax 
classification of debt and equity do exist in practice and hence contribute to hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, as indicated by the OECD. Multinationals can utilise these variations in 
designing funding arrangements like hybrid debt instruments. Further policy options may 
therefore be needed in order to address this gap. A few countries have started introducing 
special provisions in their tax legislation on the tax treatment of hybrid instruments. The 
general trend in these countries is discussed below. 
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Hybrid debt tax treatment trends 
 
In 2012, the OECD released a paper which presented the concerns and issues of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements and suggested policy options that tax authorities could implement 
(2012:13). At that stage, a few countries had started introducing specific rules targeting cross-
border hybrid instruments and the OECD noted the success in this regard (2012:14). The 
rules implemented by the countries were found to be effective and had reduced the incidence 
of mismatch arrangements being exploited by taxpayers (OECD, 2012:23-24). Over time, 
more countries have started introducing such rules. The approaches taken by countries 
broadly entail rules that deny deductions for payments which are not taxable in the hands of 
the recipient or rules that deny exemptions on income in certain situations. Examples of 
countries that have implemented such rules, as well as the problems they have faced in 
respect of such rules, is contained hereafter. In addition to the countries mentioned below, 
other countries like Hungary, Singapore, Switzerland and Poland either have or are in the 
process of introducing hybrid-specific tax rules (PwC, 2014). 
 
Denial of deductions 
 
A number of European countries have special rules denying interest deductions in particular 
instances. From a Danish tax perspective, if certain requirements are met, including the 
treatment of Danish debt as equity in the foreign (counterparty) tax jurisdiction, the 
instrument would be treated as debt for Danish tax purposes and the interest deduction 
denied. Furthermore, the payment would be subject to dividend withholding tax instead of 
interest withholding tax, which may be levied at a different rate. Specific legislation was also 
introduced by Denmark on tax arbitrage using fiscally transparent entities. These rules also 
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deny Danish tax deductions where there is no income inclusion in the foreign (counterparty) 
country for tax purposes (OECD, 2012:17-21). The United Kingdom took a similar approach 
by introducing a set of rules for denying deductions. Returns qualifying for a tax deduction in 
the United Kingdom without a corresponding or acceptable tax charge in the recipient‘s tax 
jurisdiction are captured by these rules and the tax deduction for such returns is consequently 
denied. Further factors are, however, taken into account before denying this deduction, like 
whether the main purpose was to achieve a domestic tax advantage (Van Gelder, 2013:147). 
The United Kingdom seems to focus more on whether it is part of a scheme to obtain a ‗more 
than minimal‘ local tax advantage (OECD, 2012:17-21). Other European countries with 
limitations on interest deductibility include the Netherlands, France and Sweden (van Gelder, 
2013:145). In France, special rules apply to related party loans whereby an interest deduction 
can be limited if the interest income is considered to be subject to insufficient tax (PwC, 
2014:52). Sweden has rules on the deductibility of interest which take into account the tax on 
the corresponding income and the existence of business reasons for the debt (PwC, 2014:71). 
A non-European example of a country with similar rules is Mexico. The Mexican tax 
authorities deny deductions of certain payments, like interest, where these are made to tax 
transparent entities or where it is disregarded or not included in the income of the recipient 
(PwC, 2014:60). 
 
Denial of exemptions 
 
Some European countries have special rules denying dividend exemptions in particular 
instances. Countries like Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and New Zealand deny 
exemptions on income for which a deduction could be claimed in the foreign (counterparty) 
tax jurisdiction. These mainly apply to dividends received on an equity investment in a 
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foreign tax jurisdiction (OECD, 2012:17-21 and PwC, 2014:55). The Netherlands applies 
certain tests which can result in dividend exemptions being denied in the hands of the Dutch 
taxpayer, namely, comparing the tax treatment in the foreign tax jurisdiction to the Dutch tax 
treatment and evaluating whether the assets of a foreign subsidiary consists mainly of hybrid 
financing receivables (van Gelder, 2013:145). The United Kingdom has legislation on taxing 
certain receipts that would otherwise not be subject to tax. Particular criteria are evaluated, 
like the existence of a scheme and the receipt of a non-taxable amount that was deductible for 
the payer (Davis Tax Committee, 2014:39).  
 
Common problems 
 
While success amongst countries was noted, problems were also being faced by the countries 
in enforcing their hybrid instrument tax rules. Some of these were that the rules needed to be 
constantly monitored and amendments made to address structures that circumvent the rules; 
the reference to foreign tax treatments created difficulties in application; tie-breaker clauses 
were needed to resolve disputes where both countries took the foreign tax treatment into 
account; and the rules created administrative burdens (OECD, 2012:23-24). It was therefore a 
learning process. Knowledge needed to be shared between countries and additional 
disclosures were required on these arrangements (OECD, 2012:25). While the OECD did 
mention a harmonised tax treatment by countries, it is interesting to note that at that stage (in 
2012) the OECD acknowledged that a harmonised approach was not likely to happen 
(OECD, 2012:13). Nonetheless, the OECD has emphasised a harmonised approach in both its 
2014 and 2015 reports. OECD member countries have since agreed to work together in 
implementing consistent and co-ordinated rules. In addition, the OECD has stated that it will 
develop a comprehensive framework for monitoring the implementation of recommendations 
81 
 
by countries, and all interested countries are able to participate on an equal basis (EY, 
2015:11). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Countries have become more wary of the tax classification of debt and equity. There is a 
distinct move towards considering the substance of an instrument rather than its legal form. 
Various guidelines are being established and followed by the different countries. In addition, 
tax-specific rules addressing hybrid instruments is proving to be fairly successful amongst 
countries and, despite the problems experienced, is gaining more momentum. While the 
specific rules differ between countries, the broad approach taken is comparable with the 
recent OECD recommendations. However, it is largely European countries that have or are 
looking to introduce such rules, which strengthens the concern that the OECD 
recommendations could prove to be a challenge for many countries.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT – Tax policies adopted by South Africa  
 
Introduction 
 
Like many other countries around the world, South Africa is faced with the same debt/equity 
tax classification concerns regarding hybrid instruments and the same concerns on tax 
planning techniques that utilise such instruments. A hybrid debt instrument grants the 
borrower of the funds the ability to claim deductions on the returns paid on the instrument, 
without a corresponding inclusion in the income of the lender. Within both a domestic and 
cross-border context, tax planning techniques can be applied whereby the corresponding 
income is not subject to tax or is subject to a minimal level of tax. With cross-border 
arrangements, these tax planning techniques may become more difficult to detect, and, in 
addition, further tax planning techniques can be employed. Profits can thereby be shifted out 
of South Africa, resulting in lost tax revenues. One of the steps taken by National Treasury to 
address this risk was the introduction of specific hybrid debt legislation. This chapter 
discusses the background to the introduction and amendments made in respect of this 
legislation, the mechanics of the legislation and how the legislation (broadly) compares to 
international recommendations and trends.  
 
Background to the introduction of hybrid debt legislation 
 
National Treasury recognised in 2004 that an instrument characterised as debt may display 
the characteristics of equity and that such (hybrid) instruments were being used 
internationally for a number of years, often to exploit the difference between debt and equity 
83 
 
(National Treasury, 2004:19). National Treasury therefore believed that there was an urgent 
need to improve anti-avoidance legislation on hybrid instruments (SARS, 2004:8).  
 
The tax rules on hybrid instruments at the time were based on case law and various sections 
of the Income Tax Act, namely, the gross income definition contained in section 1; section 
8E on hybrid equity instruments; the general deduction formula (falling within section 11 
read together with section 23); and the general anti-avoidance provisions in section 103. 
Section 8E was the only specific legislation on hybrid instruments but was limited to certain 
hybrid equity instruments only. It was considered far too narrow. Furthermore, there were no 
rules recharacterising interest as dividends where disguised dividends were concerned. There 
was also concern about manipulation of financial instruments and arrangements in order to 
reduce overall taxes (National Treasury, 2004:19). As such, it was announced in the 2004 
National Budget by the then Minister of Finance that legislation which would characterise 
hybrid instruments based on their underlying economic substance would be introduced 
(SARS, 2004:8). 
 
The proposal by National Treasury on hybrid debt instruments was that a section be 
introduced which specifically limited the deductibility of interest for persons other than 
natural persons on instruments that were equity in substance. In this manner, tax avoidance 
using such instruments would be countered. The focus of the legislation that National 
Treasury intended to propose included inter alia debt with a principal that was effectively 
never repayable and rules addressing concerns on domestic hybrids compared to foreign 
hybrids (SARS, 2004:8). While the latter concerns were not detailed by National Treasury, it 
appeared to relate to section 24J, which is the section that governs the taxation of interest in 
respect of interest-bearing arrangements. National Treasury proposed amendments to section 
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24J, stating that this was due to the manipulation of financial instruments and the use of 
hybrid instruments within complex financing structures. The tax avoided as a result of these 
structures was estimated at many billions of Rand (National Treasury, 2004:20). 
Amendments to section 8E on hybrid equity instruments were also proposed in order to 
expand its scope (National Treasury, 2004:23). 
 
National Treasury thereafter released a set of proposed rules on hybrid debt instruments. Very 
specific forms of hybrid debt instruments were targeted, which were essentially redeemable 
or convertible-type instruments. It was therefore a very narrow and limited scope. Despite 
various issues identified, the proposed rules were legislated and included as section 8F in the 
Income Tax Act by section 10(1) of Act 32 of 2004 (referred to hereafter as the ‗initial‘ 
section 8F).  
 
Due to the concerns relating to the initial legislation and its limited ambit, an announcement 
was made in the 2011 National Budget that specific legislation would be introduced 
concerning debt with indefinite or indeterminable maturity dates and yield calculations 
(SARS, 2011:18). National Treasury appeared to have become increasingly concerned about 
manipulation of maturity dates and distortion of interest calculations by taxpayers. 
Considerable amendments were proposed to section 8F by National Treasury in 2012. 
Various forms of hybrid debt instruments were covered by the 2012 proposals. The purpose 
of the rules was changed slightly whereby not only the return on a hybrid debt instrument but 
the instrument itself was to be recharacterised, deeming it to be a share other than an equity 
share (National Treasury, 2012a:27). The underlying shares would thus be deemed to be the 
debt principal and the returns or interest yield would be deemed to be the dividend and capital 
distributions on the instrument (National Treasury, 2013b:3). A proposal was also made to 
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insert a new section in the Income Tax Act, section 8FA, which dealt with hybrid interest and 
reclassified such interest as dividends in specie (National Treasury, 2012a:28). These 
proposals were made after the release of the OECD‘s first document mentioning hybrid 
mismatch arrangements in 2010, the focus of which was bank losses, but around the same 
time as the release by the OECD of its 2012 paper on hybrid mismatch arrangements. South 
Africa was thus at the forefront of tax legislation changes.  
 
The draft proposals released by National Treasury in 2012 were later removed from the final 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012 due to the rules being overly broad and unnecessarily 
complex, negatively impacting commercial transactions not driven by tax (National Treasury, 
2013b:3). The proposals were reconsidered and a new draft issued in 2013, which took into 
account public comments that National Treasury had received on the 2012 proposals 
(National Treasury, 2013b:2-3). The impact of the 2013 proposed rules remained largely the 
same as the 2004 version of section 8F whereby only the return on a hybrid debt instrument 
(i.e. interest) was recharacterised as a dividend and the nature of the instrument itself (i.e. 
corpus) was not affected, unlike initially proposed in 2012 (National Treasury, 2013e:29-30). 
In addition, the rules on hybrid interest were slightly narrower than those initially proposed in 
2012 (National Treasury, 2013f:20). Certain exemptions from the hybrid debt and hybrid 
interest rules were also listed in the 2013 proposal (National Treasury, 2013e:30). While 
further public comments were submitted to National Treasury, minimal amendments to the 
2013 proposal were subsequently made. Two of the comments that were accepted by 
National Treasury were that the effective date of the proposed rules should be moved forward 
to allow taxpayers to restructure their affairs in view of the proposals; and that the proposed 
rules were restricted to debt owed by resident companies and there was no clear reason as to 
why it did not apply to branches of foreign resident companies (National Treasury, 
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2013c:17). A number of other comments were either partially or fully rejected (National 
Treasury, 2013d:9-11). The draft legislation was promulgated in 2013 and introduced into the 
Income Tax Act by section 12(1) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2013 (referred to 
hereafter as the ‗current‘ section 8F). While the ambit of the legislation was widened by the 
amendments, the scope was still limited to specific forms of hybrid debt instruments.  
 
National Treasury commented in 2013 that the amendments were in light of an increasing 
concern, both within South Africa and globally, for tax schemes undertaken by taxpayers 
(National Treasury, 2013b:1). At this stage, the OECD had released their comprehensive 
report on base erosion and profit shifting, in which hybrid instruments were identified as a 
key pressure area (OECD, 2013a:47). The use of these instruments was increasing and it was 
quickly becoming a global tax concern. Adding to a statement made by the OECD that profit 
shifting is a significant source of base erosion, National Treasury pointed out that a 
substantial amount of base erosion occurs in South Africa due to excessive deductions being 
claimed, normally by way of interest, royalties, service fees and insurance premiums, with 
the corresponding income flowing to low- or no-tax countries. Their biggest concern was that 
of excessive interest deductions and hybrid debt was identified as one of the areas that needed 
addressing (National Treasury, 2013b:1). National Treasury recognised hybrid debt 
instruments as instruments with a label of debt but that have substantive equity features. They 
considered the label of debt to be purely for tax reasons, i.e. to obtain a tax deduction on the 
returns and to benefit from cross-border tax arbitrage. The legislation was thus part of an 
initiative to curb excessive interest deductions (National Treasury, 2013b:2). 
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Initial legislation on hybrid debt – section 8F 
 
The initial section 8F (promulgated in 2004) was comprised of subsections (1) and (2), with 
subsection (1) containing the definition of a hybrid debt instrument and subsection (2) 
containing the tax implications that apply to such an instrument. The mechanics of section 8F 
was as follows: 
 The recipient of funds under a funding instrument (borrower) needed to evaluate the 
instrument and determine whether it fell within one of the categories specified under 
section 8F(1), in which case it would be classified as a hybrid debt instrument.  
 If the instrument was classified as such, then section 8F(2) resulted in interest on that 
hybrid debt instrument being denied as a deduction in the hands of the borrower.  
 
The initial section 8F is included in Appendix A for reference purposes. Since the ambit of 
the legislation is considered the main concern, this is discussed first and thereafter further 
concerns of the legislation. 
 
Ambit of initial legislation 
 
The initial section 8F was considered too narrow in its scope and the rules could easily be 
averted. Only specific types of instruments fell within the definition of a ―hybrid debt 
instrument‖, namely, convertible loan transactions; convertible preference shares; convertible 
debt; and revenue stream swaps (Brincker, 2011:B2.4). Furthermore, the legislation was 
restricted to a three year test, which is the same time period applied in section 8E on hybrid 
equity instruments. The rules were hence considered inadequate and mostly ineffective in 
counteracting the inconsistency between the commercial and the tax nature of hybrid 
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instruments. Moreover, case law principles were seldom being applied in recharacterising 
instruments based on their substance (Mitchell et al, 2012:16 and van der Zwan, 2014:52).  
 
The four types of instruments that fell within the ―hybrid debt instrument‖ definition are as 
follows: 
1. The first type referred to debt that a company, being the recipient of the loan funding, had 
a right to discharge within three years from the date of issue of that instrument through the 
conversion into or exchange for a share in that same company. Alternatively, the debt 
could be discharged by a share in another company, provided that other company was a 
connected person in relation to the recipient company at the time (Brincker, 2011:B3.3). 
2. The second type was very similar to the first, except that the word ―repayment‖ was used 
in place of ―convertible into or exchangeable for‖. In addition, it expressly provided for a 
full or partial settlement of the debt. Brincker pointed out that the situation of a cash 
repayment by the company followed by an immediate subscription for shares in the 
company by the lender was not dealt with by the legislation (2011:B3.3). 
3. The third type dealt with a repayment of the debt, whereby the company had a right to 
repay that debt within three years from the date of issue and, in addition, had a right to 
force the lender to subscribe for or acquire shares in that company or in a ―connected 
person‖ of that company. Brincker stated that instruments where the lender, as opposed to 
the company, had a right to the subscription or acquisition of shares was not dealt with 
(2011:B3.3). 
4. The last type was similar to the first type except that it was the lender that had to have held 
a right to have the debt discharged in the manner described. It also contained a further 
requirement, namely, that it had to be determined at the date of issue that the value of the 
share at the time of conversion or exchange was likely to exceed the value of the debt 
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instrument by at least twenty percent. Listed instruments issued by listed companies were 
excluded. According to Brincker, the legislation was restricted to conversion or exchange 
and did not include a subscription or acquisition of shares. Brincker stated further that it 
also did not apply where it was not possible to determine the future value of the share (at 
the time of conversion or exchange). Brincker added that if the debt was convertible at the 
fair market of the shares, it would be treated as debt until conversion or exchange 
(2011:B3.3). 
 
It is understood from the Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 
2004 that the reasoning behind introducing such a definition was that debt that is convertible 
or exchangeable into equity is equivalent to debt that gives the lender the benefit of an equity 
upside (National Treasury, 2004:25). In effect, it provides protection against declines in the 
market as the equity is issued at the face value of the bond, while at the same time allowing 
the lender to participate in equity increases. The lender is thus entitled to fixed income and 
also shares in equity movements, although the lender can be exposed to equity losses 
(Brincker, 2011:B3.1). The legislation specifically targeted hybrid instruments that combine 
the expected time value returns with the exposure to changes in the equity value of a 
company (National Treasury, 2004:19). In addition, National Treasury‘s view is that 
convertible debt is generally issued with the aim of converting it into equity rather than 
redeeming it at maturity (National Treasury, 2004:25). These types of instruments were thus 
of special concern to National Treasury as they lacked a key characteristic of debt, which is 
the repayment requirement (National Treasury, 2004:19). The three year test was due to 
instruments that are convertible into equity within a three year period being placed by 
National Treasury at the equity end of the debt/equity spectrum (Brincker, 2011:B3.1).  
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As a result of the limited application of the rules, it was expected that additional legislation 
would be introduced at a later stage (Brincker, 2011:B2.4).  
 
Other concerns of the initial legislation 
 
Although various issues were identified at proposal stage, National Treasury continued to 
promulgate the legislation in 2004 without any changes. For instance, the term ―instrument‖ 
referred to in the section was not defined and it had to be assumed that the term had the same 
meaning as defined in section 24J, despite section 24J definitions being limited to section 24J 
only (Brincker, 2011:B3.2-3.3). Two of the more significant concerns, the one-sided 
application of the legislation and the effective date of application, are explained in more 
detail below. 
 
One-sided application 
The hybrid debt instrument rules effectively denied the interest deduction for the borrower, 
deeming the interest to be a dividend subject to secondary tax on companies (a special tax 
that applied to companies on their dividend declarations, prior to the introduction of 
dividends tax). The corresponding interest income, on the other hand, was still treated as 
taxable interest income in the hands of the lender (National Treasury, 2004:24). It was thus 
only a partial recharacterisation and a double penalisation as it denied a deduction for the 
payment but still taxed the corresponding income. Hence two layers of tax was being levied 
on the income, one at borrower level through application of secondary tax on companies and 
the second at lender level through normal income tax rules. This appeared to be a distinct 
choice by the legislator to not treat the tax position of the recipient and the funder in a 
uniform manner (Brincker, 2011:B2.4).  
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Effective date of application 
Brincker pointed out that there was confusion as to the date and scope of applicability of the 
proposed legislation. According to the Income Tax Act, the legislation came into operation 
on 26 October 2004 and applied in respect of any instrument issued or transferred to an issuer 
during any year of assessment commencing on or after that date. Firstly, it was unclear as to 
whether the year of assessment referred to that of the funder or the recipient or both. Next, 
the words ―issued to an issuer‖ did not make logical sense. Lastly, existing instruments and 
instruments where the terms had been changed were not dealt with, although the latter was 
dealt with under the ―date of issue‖ definition (Brincker, 2011:B3.1). For instruments already 
in existence, it appeared that the rules only applied to interest that was paid or payable after 
the instrument became a hybrid debt instrument, thus interest already paid (prior to the rules 
becoming applicable) was not affected (Brincker, 2011:B3.2-3.3). However, this was not 
explicitly dealt with in the legislation.  
 
Addressing the concerns of initial legislation 
 
National Treasury acknowledged that hybrid instruments combine debt and equity features 
and that the economic substance of an instrument may differ from its tax characterisation. 
National Treasury views debt as redeemable with a yield based on the time value of money. It 
has payment obligations that exist regardless of the profit or cash flow position of the debtor. 
Equity is typically non-redeemable with a yield dependent on the profits of the company and 
payment obligations are discretionary or can be deferred without legal implications (National 
Treasury, 2013c:27). With these and other principles in mind, National Treasury released a 
set of draft proposals for significantly amended hybrid debt legislation. Hence the proposals 
were meant to address the concerns of the legislation at that time, including the narrow scope; 
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the restrictive time period of three years; the one-sided application of the rules; and the 
uncertainty relating to the effective date of application.  
 
The current sections 8F and 8FA (promulgated in 2013) are considered to address the 
weaknesses of the previous legislation on hybrid debt instruments. There appears to be 
limited opportunity to manipulate instruments in order to avoid falling within the sections. 
The instrument as a whole and the yield are both assessed more comprehensively. There is no 
longer a one-sided implication as the current rules apply consistently to both parties to the 
instrument (National Treasury, 2013e:29-30). There is no reference to the creation of the 
instrument in the effective date and the wording is much clearer (the sections apply to interest 
incurred on or after the effective date of 1 April 2014 and it applies to all existing 
instruments).  
 
Current legislation on hybrid debt – sections 8F and 8FA 
 
The Income Tax Act thus currently contains two sections on hybrid debt, sections 8F and 
8FA (as opposed to the single section previously contained in the Income Tax Act). The 
current section 8F (promulgated in 2013) is laid out in a similar manner compared to the 
initial section 8F (promulgated in 2004). It contains the relevant definitions, the implication 
of falling within this section and the exclusions to this section. Section 8FA is also laid out in 
this way. The first section, section 8F on hybrid debt instruments, deals with the instrument 
itself (i.e. the corpus) and its related returns. The second section, section 8FA on hybrid 
interest, deals solely with returns on an instrument (i.e. nature of the yield). Section 8FA is 
not specific to hybrid debt instruments and can apply to any instrument (National Treasury, 
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2013b:3). For the purposes of these sections, ―instrument‖ means any form of interest-bearing 
arrangement or debt. 
 
Sections 8F and 8FA contain deeming provisions that recharacterise the return on the 
instrument. The instrument itself is not recharacterised. Both the instrument and any potential 
side arrangements were taken into account in drafting the legislation (National Treasury, 
2013c:29).  
 
Hybrid debt instrument – ambit of section 8F 
 
Like the initial section 8F, only specific instruments were targeted by the hybrid debt 
instrument rules. The specific instruments targeted by National Treasury is apparent from the 
amended definition ascribed to the term ―hybrid debt instrument‖, contained in the current 
section 8F titled ―Interest on hybrid debt instruments deemed to be dividends in specie‖. 
Section 8F can be referred to in Appendix B.  
 
A hybrid debt instrument is created in the following three situations: 
1. Non-market value related conversions – The first situation occurs where, in the particular 
year of assessment, the company has a right to or is forced to partially or fully convert or 
exchange an interest-bearing arrangement under which it owes an amount of money for 
shares, unless the market value of those shares equates to the amount owed at the time of 
conversion or exchange. A conversion based on the value of the debt rather than a fixed 
number of shares should not be caught under this category (van der Zwan, 2014:52). 
2. Solvency-based repayments – The second situation occurs where the obligation to pay any 
amount owing under the interest-bearing arrangement is dependent on the solvency of the 
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company (i.e. the market value of all assets should equal or exceed the market value of all 
liabilities). It was indicated by van der Zwan that a court decision noted that, even in the 
absence of specific repayment terms, where the lender was aware that borrower was not 
able to repay a loan, the lender could not reasonably have expected repayment and hence 
there is an implicit condition in the repayment terms, which is that the borrower has the 
ability to pay. This principle should, however, not impact this second solvency-based 
trigger of a hybrid debt instrument (2014:52). With respect to subordination clauses, these 
should be avoided or reworded in order to prevent subordinated loans from being captured 
under this category (Jackson et al, 2015). 
3. Connected person redemptions beyond a reasonable time frame – The third situation 
occurs where the amount owing under an interest-bearing arrangement is owing to a 
connected person and the discharge of all liabilities under such an arrangement does not 
have to take place for a period up to thirty years, calculated either from the date of issue or 
the end of that year of assessment (van der Zwan, 2014:52). Redemption within a 
reasonable time frame is considered by National Treasury a key feature of debt and the 
lack of such a feature indicates that the instrument is more equity-like, especially where 
the funding has been extended by a related party that forms part of the same economic unit 
(2013c:29). Where the instrument can be converted to or exchanged for another financial 
instrument (other than a share) at the option of the company, the two instruments must be 
deemed to be one and the same for the purposes of the thirty year trigger. Extension 
clauses within loan agreements have not been dealt with, creating scope for avoiding this 
trigger. Instruments payable on demand are excluded from this last type of hybrid, which 
should assist with many instruments avoiding the implications of the hybrid debt rules 
(van der Zwan, 2014:52 and Jackson et al, 2015). According to van der Zwan, a well-
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established common law principle is that the lack of specific repayment terms within a 
loan agreement essentially makes it repayable on demand (2014:52-53). 
 
The current definition is considered by van der Zwan to be an improvement on the previous 
one as there is limited opportunity to manipulate instruments in order to avoid the 
consequences of the sections. The features that trigger a hybrid debt instrument are much 
wider and are predominantly not linked to a timeframe, as was the situation with the three 
year rule of the previous definition (van der Zwan, 2014:50,52). Nonetheless, the rules only 
target the specific types of hybrid instruments that were of concern to National Treasury. 
There may be other hybrid debt instruments that are being used in practice which demonstrate 
a number of equity characteristics but fall outside of the ambit of section 8F. At the same 
time, a broader definition than what currently applies may capture too many instruments and 
be too onerous for taxpayers. It may also result in differences in interpretation and application 
between taxpayers and SARS. The ambit of the rules may therefore be adequate. 
 
Hybrid interest – ambit of section 8FA 
 
As part of the two-pronged approach taken by National Treasury, section 8FA titled ―Hybrid 
interest deemed to be dividends in specie‖ was also introduced, which contains a new tax 
term ―hybrid interest‖. Section 8FA can be referred to in Appendix B. Based on the ―hybrid 
interest‖ definition, any interest which is not based on a specified rate or on the time value of 
money is considered to be hybrid interest. Additionally, an increase in the rate of interest 
which is based on increased profits (i.e. profit-dependent returns) is also considered to be 
hybrid interest.  
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According to van der Zwan, the wording of the definition creates opportunities for 
interpretation. For instance, there is uncertainty as to whether the interest must be calculated 
solely using a specified interest rate or time value of money in order to avoid section 8FA, or 
whether other factors could be included in the calculation. Since it is not expressly stated, it 
could be interpreted that interest calculated using a specified rate / time value of money 
together with other factors would not be hybrid interest. Another uncertainty is whether the 
interest must be divided into the components of its calculation. It could be argued that a 
proportionate approach be taken and the portion that is calculated using a specified rate or the 
time value of money would not be hybrid interest while the remaining portion would be (van 
der Zwan, 2014:54-55). The legislation may therefore need further consideration by National 
Treasury and supporting guidelines. Regarding the second part of the hybrid interest 
definition, one option of avoiding the provisions of section 8FA from being triggered is for 
parties to determine a rate of interest that the company will be able to consistently pay based 
on its estimated earnings, as opposed to linking repayments to the company‘s earnings 
(Jackson et al, 2015).  
 
Summary of ambit of sections 8F and 8FA 
 
The scope of sections 8F and 8FA has been summarised by van der Zwan in the figure 
hereunder. He recommended a revision of the terms of existing instruments, where required, 
in order to avoid falling within the scope of these sections (2014:52,55). 
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Application by the courts – substance over form 
 
Despite the terms ―hybrid debt instrument‖ and ―hybrid interest‖ being specifically defined in 
sections 8F and 8FA of the Income Tax Act, some practitioners like Lewis have warned 
taxpayers about the substance over form principle that is applied by the courts (Lewis, 
2013:2). Courts are not bound by labels given to agreements or subjective views, instead the 
courts will base their decision on the true nature of the rights and obligations agreed to 
between the parties i.e. the ‗real‘ rather than ‗disguised‘ agreement (de Koker & Brincker, 
2010:8.6.30 and Roodt, n.d.). Examples of court cases where the substance over form 
doctrine was applied include Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith & Another v CIR 1996 (3) SA 942 (A), 
CCE v Randles Bros & Hudson Ltd 1941 AD 369 and Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302.  
 
It has been recommended that care be taken with regards to the terms and conditions of the 
instrument; its true nature should be established (Lewis, 2013:2). The rights and obligations 
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contained within an agreement must therefore correspond with the true intention of the 
agreement (de Koker & Brincker, 2010:8.6.32). In disguised arrangements where the parties 
never intended to enforce the rights and obligations as they are presented, the form is ignored 
and the real intention is given effect to. This is referred to as the sham doctrine and applies 
more so where there is dishonesty or deception by the parties (de Koker & Brincker, 
2010:8.6.28-8.6.30). Based on the substance over form principle and its application by the 
courts, a debt instrument can thus be reclassified as equity by the courts without regard to the 
ambit of section 8F and 8FA, when having regard to the principles set out in case law in 
respect of the application of the substance over form or sham doctrines. Reclassification is 
hence not restricted only to situations where specific sections of the Income Tax Act apply.  
 
Tax implications of falling within sections 8F and 8FA  
 
Sections 8F and 8FA have the effect that interest (i.e. return on the instrument) that is 
incurred during a year of assessment by a company (referred to hereafter as the ‗borrower 
company‘) in respect of a ―hybrid debt instrument‖ or in respect of ―hybrid interest‖ is 
deemed to be a dividend in specie declared and paid by that borrower company on the last 
day of the borrower company‘s year of assessment and is no longer deductible in the 
determination of the borrower‘s taxable income. Correspondingly, the interest (i.e. return on 
the instrument) that accrues to the person that extended the funds (referred to hereafter as the 
‗lender‘) is deemed to be a dividend in specie declared and paid to such lender on that same 
day. All companies are subject to these implications, including foreign companies (Income 
Tax Act). 
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The borrower company is therefore not entitled to any deduction in respect of interest for 
South African tax purposes (Clegg & Stretch, 2014:24.20.2). The disallowance applies to 
interest arising on an instrument from the date that instrument becomes a ―hybrid debt 
instrument‖ or the interest becomes ―hybrid interest‖. The rules apply until the definitions of 
―hybrid debt instrument‖ or ―hybrid interest‖ cease to be met (Clegg & Stretch, 2014:24.20.2-
24.20.3). This implies that an instrument needs to regularly be tested in order to establish 
whether it is captured by section 8F. This understanding is in line with the view by National 
Treasury that debt must be continually tested to determine if it is commercially real or 
artificial in nature (2013c:29). The term ―issue‖ is also referred to in section 8F, specifically, 
in the definition of ―hybrid debt instrument‖. It means the ―creation of a liability to pay an 
amount in terms of that instrument‖. Based on this definition, the disallowance applies from 
the date that the company becomes indebted (de Koker & Williams, 2014:17.72C). However, 
this is specific to the third category of instruments that are captured by section 8F, which 
contains the 30 year maximum redemption period.  
 
In addition to the disallowance of the interest, the borrower company would need to account 
for a dividend in specie. Dividends, including dividends in specie, are subject to the 
dividends tax provisions contained in sections 64D to 64N. Where a dividend in specie has 
been declared and paid by a South African tax resident company (i.e. the borrower in this 
instance), that South African tax resident borrower company will be liable for dividends tax 
in terms of section 64EA(b). Dividends tax applies at a rate 15% per section 64E, unless an 
exemption or reduced rate per section 64FA applies. One of the potential exemptions that 
could apply is the resident company exemption, if the beneficial owner of the dividend (i.e. 
the lender in this instance) is a South African tax resident company. A reduced rate usually 
applies in terms of an applicable double taxation agreement and hence could apply where the 
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recipient, being the beneficial owner of the dividend, is a non-tax resident. According to 
SARS, the dividends tax levied in this instance (i.e. on an amount that is deemed to be a 
dividend in specie, the liability for which falls in the hands of the paying company) will not 
qualify for a reduced rate under an applicable double taxation agreement. There is some 
debate on whether a reduced rate could apply, however, this discussion involves double 
taxation agreements and hence falls outside the scope of this report. Through application of 
section 64K(1)(b), the South African tax resident borrower company must pay the dividends 
tax over to SARS on the last day of the month following the end of the year of assessment (as 
the dividend in specie is deemed to be declared and paid on the last day of the year of 
assessment for section 8F purposes). Certain required declarations and documentation must 
also be submitted to SARS per section 64K (BDO, 2014:3-4; SARS, 2015a:76-78,110-111; 
and Income Tax Act).  
 
The lender is also subject to sections 8F and 8FA and will similarly treat the interest as a 
dividend in specie. The lender will not recognise interest income but dividend income, which 
is specifically captured under paragraph (k) of the gross income definition and will hence 
have to be included in the gross income computation of the lender. The lender should qualify 
for an exemption under section 10(1)(k)(i) for that dividend income, which is commonly 
referred to as the ‗local dividend exemption‘, unless one of the exceptions to the exemption 
applies. These tax implications will apply to the lender irrespective of whether the lender is a 
South African tax resident or not, and irrespective of whether the borrower is a South African 
tax resident or not (SARS, 2015a:76-78 and Income Tax Act). 
 
For non-tax residents, sections 8F and 8FA will only be relevant where these non-tax 
residents are subject to the provisions of the Income Tax Act (i.e. where they fall within the 
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South African tax net) and are required to compute their taxable income for South African tax 
purposes. Should non-tax residents be party to the instrument, the tax implications in the 
foreign jurisdiction would also need to be taken into account. The payment(s) captured under 
the deeming rules of sections 8F and 8FA may still be considered to be interest by the foreign 
jurisdiction and foreign tax implications relating to interest may still arise (in addition to the 
implications of sections 8F and 8FA). The impact of withholding taxes, double tax 
agreements and foreign tax credits would also have to be considered, where applicable. 
Further discussion on this falls outside the scope of this report. 
 
With respect to the definition of ―interest‖ for the purposes of sections 8F and 8FA, a point to 
be noted is that it is defined as ―interest as defined in section 24J‖. The definition of the term 
―interest‖ as contained in section 24J(1) (set out in Appendix B) essentially includes any 
interest or related finance charges, discount or premium payable or receivable; and certain 
amounts payable by a borrower to the lender in terms of a lending arrangement. Section 24J 
also contains principles on calculating the quantum of the interest that is to be included or 
deducted by taxpayers in their taxable income computations (ENSafrica, 2015). According to 
ENSafrica, it is not clear whether the provisions of section 8F and 8FA apply to 
recharacterise amounts of interest equal to the stated interest in respect of the relevant 
instrument, or the amounts of interest as determined in accordance with section 24J. It is also 
not clear how recharacterised amounts are taken into account for purposes of 
determining, inter alia, accrual amounts and adjusted gains and losses in terms of section 24J. 
ENSafrica anticipate complications when applying sections 8F or 8FA in conjunction with 
section 24J (2015). 
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Per section 8F(3) and section 8FA(3), the provisions of sections 8F and 8FA do not apply in 
the following instances: 
 an instrument or debt in respect of which all amounts are owed by a small business 
company (as defined); 
 a tier 1 or tier 2 capital instrument referred to in the regulations issued in terms of 
section 90 of the Banks Act, where it has been issued by a bank or controlling 
company in relation to that bank; 
 certain instruments that are subject to approval as contemplated in the specified 
section of the Short-term Insurance Act, in terms of which amount are owing by a 
short-term insurer and similarly with long-term insurers; and  
 an instrument that contains a linked unit in a company, where those linked units are at 
least 20% held by a long-term insurer, a pension fund, a provident fund, a REIT or a 
short-term insurer and were acquired before 1 January 2013, and at the end of the 
previous year of assessment at least 80% of the value of the assets of that company is 
attributable to immoveable property. 
 
From the analysis above it is apparent that the purpose of the provisions of sections 8F and 
8FA is to recharacterise the return on disguised equity as a dividend, with the result that both 
the issuer and the holder of the instrument are taxed as if the instrument represented equity. 
Sections 8F and 8FA thereby assist in reducing excessive interest deductions, which was 
noted as a concern by National Treasury. However, it is important to note that the results of 
these sections are not entirely aligned with the recommendations by the OECD. 
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Summary on tax implications and considerations for the parties to an instrument captured by 
sections 8F or 8FA 
 
 South African tax resident 
lender (company) 
Non-tax resident lender 
(company) 
South African tax 
resident borrower 
(company) 
 No tax deduction on interest 
expense for borrower. 
 Dividends tax liability arises 
for borrower; however, 
resident company exemption 
should be available. 
 Dividend income included in 
gross income of lender; 
however, local dividend 
exemption should be available. 
 No tax deduction on interest 
expense for borrower. 
 Dividends tax liability arises 
for borrower. 
 Dividend income included in 
gross income of lender; 
however, local dividend 
exemption should be available. 
Non-tax resident 
borrower 
(company) 
 Potential tax deduction on 
interest expense for borrower 
in foreign jurisdiction. 
 Potential foreign withholding 
tax on interest paid to lender 
(no foreign tax credits will be 
available for lender if the 
income is exempt). 
 No dividends tax liability. 
 Not relevant for South African 
tax purposes as it should only 
involve foreign tax 
jurisdictions. 
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 Dividend income included in 
gross income of lender; 
however, local dividend 
exemption should be available. 
 
Policy approach in comparison with other countries and OECD 
recommendations 
 
National Treasury has focused on protecting South Africa‘s tax base by denying interest 
deductions on instruments that it considers a commonly used tool for achieving unwarranted 
interest deductions through the disguising of equity instruments as debt or equity returns as 
interest. National Treasury adopted the approach of specifically defining the terms ―hybrid 
debt instrument‖ and ―hybrid interest‖ for South African tax purposes. The South African 
approach thereby targets particular instruments and restricts the application of hybrid debt 
legislation to those particular instruments only. National Treasury also chose not to include 
any references in the legislation to foreign (tax) laws. This differs from the approach taken by 
countries like Australia and the United States, where guiding factors are used to assist with 
the debt/equity classification of hybrid instruments rather than a strict rule. It also differs 
from countries like the United Kingdom and Singapore, where the foreign tax treatment of a 
hybrid instrument is considered in determining the domestic tax treatment. Linking the 
domestic tax implication to the foreign one is in line with the OECD domestic law 
recommendations made on hybrid debt instruments.  
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By targeting specific instruments only, there is the disadvantage of narrowing the ambit of 
the application of the South African hybrid debt reclassification rules and therefore risking 
many hybrid debt instruments not being captured by the legislation. The advantage is that 
there is much less room for subjectivity and interpretation, which helps to reduce the 
potential for challenges by taxpayers and the administrative burden on tax authorities. 
Overall, a definition targeting specific instruments releases both National Treasury and 
taxpayers from the difficult task of trying to classify each funding instrument as debt or as 
equity based on its agreed terms and conditions. Similarly, excluding foreign references in 
legislation is also an administratively easier and less burdensome approach, as confirmed by 
the experience of other countries in the 2012 report of the OECD (2012:23-24). It does not 
mean that National Treasury is completely adverse to referencing foreign tax treatment in its 
tax legislation, as this was done with the provisions on foreign dividends (initially, a 
reference to the foreign tax law treatment was included in the ―foreign dividend‖ definition in 
section 1 of the Income Tax Act in order to assist with the consistent global treatment of 
hybrid equity instruments and the reduction of tax arbitrage, and later it was moved to section 
10B which deals with foreign dividend exemptions) (National Treasury, 2010:85 and 
National Treasury, 2012c:144). It is therefore possible that a similar approach be taken in 
future on interest deductions. 
 
Another point to note is that National Treasury specifically targeted instruments that it 
considered to be equity in nature but which were classified as debt by taxpayers. The OECD, 
on the other hand, has targeted all instruments that give rise to a tax mismatch between two or 
more jurisdictions. The OECD‘s objective is hence slightly different and more directed at 
double non-taxation and the reduction of global tax revenues. The OECD has previously 
stated (in their 2014 report) that other tax measures that countries introduce on the 
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deductibility of interest, like limitations on the quantum of interest deductions based on 
specified rules, may obviate or reduce the need for introducing hybrid debt rules as 
recommended by the OECD (2014:64). These other tax measures would, for instance, assist 
in reducing excessive debt funding or excessive interest deductions. South Africa has several 
such measures in place and many of these additional rules are in line with the various policy 
recommendations that have been made globally. One example is thin capitalisation rules, 
which have been in place in South Africa for a number of years. These rules are contained in 
section 31 and the latest amendments to these rules were enacted in 2013. Previously, a safe 
harbour ratio applied to the debt/equity funding ratio of companies. A market value approach 
currently applies. A second example is the interest deductibility rules in section 23K, 23M 
and 23N. Section 23K was legislated in 2011 and applied specifically in relation to 
reorganisation and acquisition transactions, as defined in the section. Section 23K ceased to 
apply from 1 April 2014. It was replaced by section 23N. In addition, a new section 23M was 
introduced which limits interest deductions in respect of debts owed to persons not subject to 
South African normal income tax or withholding tax. Section 23M applies from 1 January 
2015. A third example is withholding taxes on dividends and interest. Withholding tax on 
dividends, the rules for which are contained in sections 64D to 64N, came into effect as of 1 
April 2012, while withholding tax on interest only came into effect from 1 January 2015. 
Sections 50A to 50H apply to interest withholding tax. Both withholding taxes currently 
apply at a 15% rate, subject to specified exemptions. The rates can be reduced under a double 
taxation agreement entered into between South Africa and any other country, per sections 
50E(3) and 64G(3). A fourth example is the partial relief provided for equity income through 
an exemption system, whereby dividends declared by South African tax resident companies 
can be exempt from normal income tax by application of section 10(1)(k) (subject to certain 
exclusions). A fifth example is the controlled foreign company rules contained in section 9D, 
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which prevents taxable income from being shifted out of the South African tax net to other 
no- or low-tax jurisdictions through the use of foreign subsidiaries. Section 9D is considered 
to be a complex set of rules. A last example of additional rules in place in South Africa is the 
general anti-avoidance rules contained in sections 80A to 80L. These general anti-avoidance 
rules are not specific to transactions, instruments or entities. They are able to capture a wide 
range of tax avoidance situations. All of the afore-mentioned provisions assist in addressing 
the preference of debt funding compared to equity funding, excessive interest deductions and 
cross-border tax arbitrage.  
 
Considering the number of different provisions contained in the Income Tax Act aimed at 
capturing tax planning and tax avoidance techniques, it is useful to note that the Davis Tax 
Committee, a tax review committee set up in 2013 by the then Minister of Finance, pointed 
out that rules governing the deductibility of interest should be developed holistically and 
without introducing too many sections in the Income Tax Act. The Davis Tax Committee 
also recommended that broader anti-avoidance rules be introduced which capture more 
transactions, rather than the numerous specific anti-avoidance provisions that are currently in 
place (many of the above-mentioned sections are anti-avoidance provisions). The committee 
recommended a principles-based approach rather than the ‗transaction-by-a-transaction‘ 
approach currently in place. A similar comment was made on sections 8F and 8FA, which 
were considered to be quite complex and unclear. Simplified rules directed at legal principles 
rather than specific transactions was recommended (Davis Tax Committee, 2014:40,58-59). 
Specific to sections 8F and 8FA, the Davis Tax Committee is of the view that these sections 
should be linked to the tax treatment in the counterparty jurisdiction. Such a linking rule 
would take into account the existence of tax leakage through use of the instrument, which the 
current sections do not consider, and would also prevent potential tax abuse (Davis Tax 
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Committee, 2014:58-59). While the committee‘s observation was that tax avoidance using 
hybrid instrument mismatches is limited to certain ‗niche‘ transactions in South Africa, the 
committee has recommended an emphasis on mismatches rather than an ‗attack‘ on particular 
types of instruments or terms. There is currently no indication on whether further 
amendments will be made to these sections by National Treasury.  
 
The Davis Tax Committee has cautioned against South Africa making unilateral changes as 
these could make South Africa less ‗tax-friendly‘ than other jurisdictions and could thereby 
reduce South Africa‘s attractiveness as an investment location. The committee confirmed that 
international best practice is preferred (Davis Tax Committee, 2014:19). The aforementioned 
points were made by the Davis Tax Committee in its 2014 interim report on base erosion and 
profit shifting, which mirrored the base erosion and profit shifting report issued by the OECD 
in 2013. The same action plans were used, but adapted to South Africa‘s economic climate 
(Mazansky, 2015). Various South African and international stakeholders were consulted on 
adapting the action plans and addressing the tax issues raised by the OECD from a South 
African perspective, taking country-specific factors into account (Davis Tax Committee, 
2014:1,18). The committee reviewed South Africa‘s legislation in light of international 
developments, and made recommendations on potential improvement areas. This process was 
done under the broader purpose of the committee, which is to ―inquire into the role of South 
African tax system in the promotion of inclusive economic growth, employment creation, 
development and fiscal sustainability‖ (Davis Tax Committee, 2014:1). 
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CHAPTER NINE – Report summary and conclusion 
 
Over the years, globalisation and economic development have resulted in multinational 
groups structuring their operations across different countries, giving them ability to utilise tax 
planning techniques and take advantage of tax differentials between jurisdictions. Aggressive 
tax planning is considered to have eroded the tax base of many countries and resulted in 
profits being shifted from high- to low-tax jurisdictions. The increasing use of hybrid 
instruments as a tax planning technique has created concern amongst many jurisdictions. 
Debt instruments, in general, provide taxpayers with the ability to claim interest deductions, 
thereby reducing the profits that are subject to tax. Returns on equity, on the other hand, are 
declared out of after-tax profits and hence trigger distinctly different tax rules compared to 
returns on debt funding. In addition, with debt funding, the corresponding income (interest) 
can be shifted to other jurisdictions, resulting in lost tax revenues. Hybrid debt instruments 
pose a further risk to global tax revenues as they can be structured in a manner whereby the 
corresponding income is not subject to any taxes in any jurisdiction. Numerous research 
papers, including documents by the OECD, have been released on the use of hybrid 
instruments and the potential mechanisms to address the tax base erosion resulting from the 
use of such instruments.  
 
Typically, the concern around the use of hybrid debt instruments is that taxpayers achieve the 
tax benefit of obtaining a tax deduction in one jurisdiction without a corresponding inclusion 
of the income for tax purposes in the counterparty jurisdiction, resulting in an overall 
reduction in taxes paid and a tax loss from a global perspective. The tax benefit arises mainly 
due to the discrepancy in the tax classification of the hybrid debt instrument by the two 
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respective jurisdictions i.e. the host jurisdiction (where the recipient of the funds is located), 
which classifies the instrument as debt and the counterparty jurisdiction (home jurisdiction, 
where the provider of the funds is located), which classifies it as equity. Since hybrid debt 
instruments comprise of a combination of debt and equity features, its classification as debt 
or as equity does become a challenge for jurisdictions. An instrument that contains both debt 
and equity characteristics could easily fall within either category, depending on the type and 
extent of these characteristics. Furthermore, the economic substance of the instrument may 
differ from its legal form and it is the legal form of an instrument that has traditionally been 
used for tax classification purposes. While jurisdictions are moving towards a substance over 
form approach, inconsistencies amongst countries remain an issue. 
 
Numerous tax policy recommendations have been made globally. These range from entirely 
eliminating the debt/equity distinction for tax purposes and taxing the two forms of funding 
in exactly the same manner to merely reducing the tax differential between debt and equity 
funding through special tax rules. In practice, countries appear to favour less radical 
approaches and have adopted what could be termed as indirect methods to addressing the use 
of hybrid debt instruments. These indirect methods reduce the bias towards debt funding in 
general, rather than specifically target hybrid debt instruments. Examples of indirect methods 
include thin capitalisation rules, withholding tax on interest, notional deductions for 
dividends or other equity returns, and similar. More direct methods of curbing the use of 
hybrid debt instruments for tax arbitrage purposes have also been employed by various 
countries. For instance, some countries have adopted the approach of establishing specific 
tangible guidelines or criteria for determining whether an instrument should be classified as 
debt or as equity for tax purposes. Where an instrument is treated as debt, certain countries 
apply further legislation which could deny the interest deduction, depending on the foreign 
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tax treatment of the corresponding interest income. Including such foreign tax references in 
domestic legislation is in line with OECD recommendations.  
 
The OECD recommends that, as a primary rule, the domestic tax deduction for hybrid debt 
instruments be linked to the foreign tax treatment, whereby the deduction for returns on the 
instrument is only granted by the domestic tax jurisdiction to the extent that the 
corresponding income is subject to tax in the foreign tax jurisdiction. Should the primary rule 
not be applied, a secondary or defensive rule can be applied by the counterparty jurisdiction 
whereby the income is subject to tax (i.e. no exemption is granted) if it was deductible in the 
paying jurisdiction. Similar rules are recommended for the granting of dividend exemptions 
or other dividend relief mechanisms. While these are direct methods of curbing the use of 
hybrid debt instruments, the rules require a significant amount of co-operation and co-
ordination between jurisdictions. It also requires monitoring by a supervisory body like the 
OECD in order to be effectively and efficiently applied by all jurisdictions. Since 
inconsistencies in the tax classification and treatment by countries do exist and do give rise to 
tax planning opportunities, the OECD maintains that a globally co-ordinated approach is 
required. However, unilateral approaches (like the indirect methods mentioned above) may 
continue to be more attractive to some jurisdictions like South Africa.  
 
South Africa has followed a slightly different approach compared to the OECD 
recommendations, with National Treasury specifically defining terms like ―hybrid debt 
instrument‖ and ―hybrid interest‖ within the tax legislation, thereby narrowing the ambit of 
the legislation applicable to hybrid instruments. Although providing a specific definition does 
limit the number and type of instruments that are considered to be hybrid debt instruments, 
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National Treasury has targeted the most common instruments used by taxpayers in taking 
advantage of the debt/equity tax distinction. Under South African legislation dealing with 
hybrid debt instruments, a deduction is denied in respect of returns on instruments falling 
within the ―hybrid debt instrument‖ definition and returns that are considered to be ―hybrid 
interest‖. The returns are consequently treated as dividends in specie for tax purposes. A 
specific definition with a definite denial of interest on such instruments, although restrictive, 
reduces the burden on the tax authorities on trying to categorise every instrument that does 
not clearly fall within the categories of ‗pure‘ debt or ‗pure‘ equity and that should be treated 
as a hybrid debt instrument. National Treasury has also chosen not to link the South African 
tax treatment of cross-border hybrid debt instruments to the respective foreign tax treatment 
that applies to those same instruments. This limits the complexities and administrative burden 
of the legislation in trying to establish the foreign tax treatment of returns on that instrument.  
 
South Africa also has numerous other provisions in the Income Tax Act that protect the South 
African tax base and address excessive deductions and tax avoidance. Many of the policy 
recommendations made internationally have been implemented by South Africa, like 
applying limitations on the deductibility of interest, imposing withholding taxes and applying 
anti-avoidance rules. The combination of all these provisions is likely to be more than 
adequate in addressing the global tax concerns surrounding hybrid debt instruments. South 
Africa is therefore aligned with many of the global developments in tax. Measures like 
setting up the Davis Tax Committee have assisted National Treasury in comparing South 
African tax legislation to international best practices and identifying areas for improvement. 
Through these measures, international recommendations, like that of the OECD, are 
considered from a South African perspective and adapted in order to incorporate South 
African specific factors.  
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The proactive attitude of National Treasury and the pace at which it has improved on its tax 
legislation puts South Africa ahead of numerous other countries around the globe. Going 
forward, National Treasury should be wary of introducing unilateral measures to address 
global tax concerns. National Treasury should ensure it maintains a competitive tax policy 
which encourages foreign direct investment and promotes economic growth. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
8F.   Limitation of deduction of certain interest payments.—(1) For purposes of this 
section, unless the context otherwise indicates, any word to which a meaning has been 
ascribed in section 24J bears the meaning so ascribed, and—  
“date of issue” in relation to an instrument means—  
(a) the date on which it is issued; and 
(b) the  date on which that instrument becomes convertible into or exchangeable for a share 
at any time in the future;  
“hybrid debt instrument” means an instrument, where— 
(a) that instrument is at the option of the issuer convertible into or exchangeable for any 
share in that issuer or any connected person in relation to that issuer within three years 
from the date of issue of that instrument; 
(b) the issuer in relation to that instrument is entitled to repay that instrument in whole or in 
part within three years from the date of issue of that instrument by the issue of shares by 
the issuer or any connected person in relation to the issuer to the holder of the 
instrument; 
(c) the issuer in relation to that instrument is entitled to repay that instrument in whole or in 
part within three years from the date of issue of that instrument and is entitled at the time 
of that repayment to require the holder of that instrument to subscribe for or acquire 
shares in the issuer or any connected person in relation to the issuer; or 
(d) that instrument, other than a listed instrument issued by a listed company, is at the option 
of the holder convertible into or exchangeable for any share in the issuer or any 
connected person in relation to the issuer within three years from the date of issue and it 
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is determined on the date of issue that the value of that share at the time of conversion or 
exchange is likely to exceed the value of the instrument by at least 20 per cent. 
(2) No deduction shall be allowed in terms of this Act in respect of any amount paid or 
payable by an issuer in terms of a hybrid debt instrument, which is paid or becomes payable 
after that instrument becomes a hybrid debt instrument. 
 
[S. 8F inserted by s. 10 (1) of Act No. 32 of 2004 with effect from 26 October, 2004 and applicable in respect of 
any instrument issued or transferred to an issuer during any year of assessment commencing on or after that 
date.] 
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APPENDIX B 
 
8F. Interest on hybrid debt instruments deemed to be dividends in specie.—(1) For 
purposes of this section—   
“hybrid debt instrument” means any instrument in respect of which a company owes an 
amount during a year of assessment if in terms of any arrangement as defined in section 
80L— 
(a) that company is in that year of assessment entitled or obliged to—  
(i) convert that  instrument (or any part thereof) in any year of assessment to; or 
(ii) exchange that instrument (or any part thereof) in any year of assessment for, shares 
unless the market value of those shares is equal to the amount owed in terms of the 
instrument at the time of conversion or exchange;  
(b) the obligation to pay an amount in respect of that instrument is conditional upon the 
market value of the assets of that company not being less than the market value of the 
liabilities of that company; or  
(c) that company owes the amount to a connected person in relation to that company and is 
not obliged to redeem the instrument, excluding any instrument payable on demand, 
within 30 years—  
(i) from the date of issue of the instrument; or  
(ii) from the end of that year of assessment: 
Provided that, for the purposes of this paragraph, where the company has the right to— 
(aa) convert that instrument to; or 
(bb) exchange that instrument for, 
a financial instrument other than a share— 
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(A) that conversion or exchange must be deemed to be an arrangement in respect of that 
instrument; and  
(B) that instrument and that financial instrument must be deemed to be one and the same 
instrument for the purposes of determining the period within which the company is 
obliged to redeem that instrument; 
“instrument” means any form of interest-bearing arrangement or debt; 
“interest” means interest as defined in section 24J; 
“issue”, in relation to an instrument, means the creation of a liability to pay an amount in 
terms of that instrument; 
“redeem”, in relation to an instrument, means the discharge of all liability to pay all amounts 
in terms of that instrument. 
(2) Any amount of interest that during a year of assessment— 
(a) is incurred by a company in respect of a hybrid debt instrument is, on or after the date 
that the instrument becomes a hybrid debt instrument— 
(i) deemed for the purposes of this Act to be a dividend in specie declared and paid by 
that company on the last day of the year of assessment of that company; and  
(ii) not deductible in terms of this Act; and  
(b) accrues to a person to whom an amount is owed in respect of a hybrid debt instrument is 
deemed for the purposes of this Act to be a dividend in specie that is declared and paid to 
that person on the last day of the year of assessment of the company contemplated in 
paragraph (a). 
(3) This section does not apply to any instrument— 
(a) in respect of which all amounts are owed by a small business corporation as defined in 
section 12E (4); 
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(b) that constitutes a tier 1 or tier 2 capital instrument referred to in the regulations issued in 
terms of section 90 of the Banks Act (contained in Government Notice No. R.1029 
published in Government Gazette No. 35950 of 12 December 2012) issued— 
(i) by a bank as defined in section 1 of that Act; or 
(ii) by a controlling company in relation to that bank;  
[Proposed amendment: The word ―or‖ at the end of para. (b) to be added by s. 13 (1) (a) of TLA Act of 2013 
with effect from 1 January, 2016 and applicable in respect of amounts incurred on or after that date.]  
(c) of any class that is subject to approval as contemplated in the— 
(i) Short-term Insurance Act in accordance with the conditions determined in terms of 
section 23 (a) (i) of that Act by the Registrar defined in that Act, where an amount is 
owed in respect of that instrument by a short-term insurer as defined in that Act; or 
(ii) Long-term Insurance Act in accordance with the conditions determined in terms of 
section 24 (a) (i) of that Act by the Registrar defined in that Act,  where an amount 
is owed in respect of that instrument by a long-term insurer as defined in that Act; or 
[Proposed amendment: The expression ―; or‖ of a full stop at the end of para. (c) to be substituted by s. 13 (1) 
(b) of TLA Act of 2013 with effect from 1 January, 2016 and applicable in respect of amounts incurred on or 
after that date.] 
(d) that constitutes a linked unit in a company where the linked unit is held by a long-term 
insurer as defined in the Long-term Insurance Act, a pension fund, a provident fund, a 
REIT or a short-term insurer as defined in the Short-term Insurance Act, if— 
(i) the long-term insurer, pension fund, provident fund, REIT or short-term insurer 
holds at least 20 per cent of the linked units in that company; 
(ii) the long-term insurer, pension fund, provident fund, REIT or short-term insurer 
acquired those linked units before 1 January 2013; and 
(iii) at the end of the previous year of assessment 80 per cent or more of the value of the 
assets of that company, reflected in the annual financial statements prepared in 
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accordance with the Companies Act for the previous year of assessment, is directly 
or indirectly attributable to immovable property. 
[Proposed amendment: Para. (d) to be deleted by s. 13 (1) (c) of TLA Act of 2013 with effect from 1 January, 
2016 and applicable in respect of amounts incurred on or after that date.] 
 
Section 8F was substituted by s. 12 (1) of TLA Act of 2013 with effect from 1 April, 2014 and 
applicable in respect of amounts incurred on or after that date. 
 
8FA. Hybrid interest deemed to be dividends in specie.—(1) For the purposes of this 
section— 
“hybrid interest”, in relation to any debt owed by a company in terms of an instrument, 
means— 
(a) any interest where the amount of that interest is—  
(i) not determined with reference to a specified rate of interest; or  
(ii) not determined with reference to the time value of money; or  
(b) if the rate of interest has in terms of that instrument been raised by reason of an increase 
in the profits of the company, so much of the amount of interest as has been determined 
with reference to the raised rate of interest as exceeds the amount of interest that would 
have been determined with reference to the lowest rate of interest in terms of that 
instrument during the current year of assessment and the previous five years of 
assessment; 
“instrument” means any form of interest-bearing arrangement or debt; 
“interest” means interest as defined in section 24J; 
“issue”, in relation to an instrument, means the creation of a liability to pay or a right to 
receive an amount in terms of that instrument. 
(2) Any amount of interest which during a year of assessment— 
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(a) is incurred by a company in respect of hybrid interest must, on or after the date that the 
interest becomes hybrid interest—  
(i) be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be a dividend in specie declared and paid 
by that company on the last day of that year of assessment; and  
(ii) not be deductible in terms of this Act; and  
(b) accrues to a person to which an amount is owed in respect of the hybrid interest must be 
deemed for the purposes of this Act to be a dividend in specie that is declared and paid to 
that person on the last day of that year of assessment of the company contemplated in 
paragraph (a).  
(3) This section does not apply to any interest owed in respect of— 
(a) a debt owed by a small business corporation as defined in section 12E (4); 
(b) an instrument that constitutes a tier 1 or tier 2 capital instrument referred to in the 
regulations issued in terms of section 90 of the Banks Act (contained in Government 
Notice No. R.1029 published in Government Gazette No. 35950 of 12 December 2012) 
issued— 
(i) by a bank as defined in section 1 of that Act; or 
(ii) by a controlling company in relation to that bank;  
[Proposed amendment: The word ―or‖ at the end of para. (b) to be added by s. 15 (1) (a) of TLA Act of 2013 
with effect from 1 January, 2016 and applicable in respect of amounts incurred on or after that date.] 
(c) an instrument of any class that is subject to approval as contemplated— 
(i) in the Short-term Insurance Act in accordance with the conditions determined in 
terms of section 23 (a) (i) of that Act by the Registrar defined in that Act, where an 
amount is owed in respect of that instrument by a short-term insurer as defined in 
that Act; or 
(ii) in the Long-term Insurance Act in accordance with the conditions determined in 
terms of section 24 (a) (i) of that Act by the Registrar defined in that Act, where an 
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amount is owed in respect of that instrument by a long-term insurer as defined in 
that Act; or 
[Proposed amendment: The expression ―; or‖ of a full stop at the end of para. (c) to be substituted by s. 15 
(1) (b) of TLA Act of 2013 with effect from 1 January, 2016 and applicable in respect of amounts incurred 
on or after that date.] 
(d) an instrument that constitutes a linked unit in a company where the linked unit is held by 
a long-term insurer as defined in the Long-term Insurance Act, a pension fund, a 
provident fund, a REIT or a short-term insurer as defined in the Short-term Insurance 
Act, if—  
(i) the long-term insurer, pension fund, provident fund, REIT or short-term insurer 
holds at least 20 per cent of the linked units in that company;  
(ii) the long-term insurer, pension fund, provident fund, REIT or short-term insurer 
acquired those linked units before 1 January 2013; and 
(iii) at the end of the previous year of assessment 80 per cent or more of the value of the 
assets of that company, reflected in the annual financial statements prepared in 
accordance with the Companies Act for the previous year of assessment, is directly 
or indirectly attributable to immovable property.  
[Proposed amendment: Para. (d) to be deleted by s. 15 (1) (c) of TLA Act of 2013 with effect from 1 January, 
2016 and applicable in respect of amounts incurred on or after that date.] 
 
Section 8FA was inserted by s. 14 (1) of TLA Act of 2013 with effect from 1 April, 2014 and 
applicable in respect of amounts incurred on or after that date. 
 
Extract of section 24J(1): 
24J. Incurral and accrual of interest.—(1) For the purposes 
of this section, unless the context otherwise indicates— 
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… 
“interest” includes the— 
(a) gross amount of any interest or related finance charges, discount or premium payable or 
receivable in terms of or in respect of a financial arrangement; 
(b) amount (or portion thereof) payable by a borrower to the lender in terms of any lending 
arrangement as represents compensation for any amount to which the lender would, but 
for such lending arrangement, have been entitled; and  
[Para. (b) substituted by s. 27 (1) (a) of Act No. 53 of 1999 with effect from the date of promulgation of that 
Act, 24 November, 1999.] 
(c) absolute value of the difference between all amounts receivable and payable by a person 
in terms of a sale and leaseback arrangement as contemplated in section 23G throughout 
the full term of such arrangement, to which such person is a party,  
irrespective of whether such amount is— 
(i) calculated with reference to a fixed rate of interest or a variable rate of interest; or 
(ii) payable or receivable as a lump sum or in unequal instalments during the term of the 
financial arrangement; 
[Definition of ―interest‖ substituted by s. 19 (1) (a) of Act No. 28 of 1997.] 
… 
